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Abstract
The purpose of this work is to trace the genesis of doux commerce from its origins
as a social phenomenon, to its employment as a political theory in the Spirit of the Laws
by the Enlightenment philosophe Montesquieu, to its implementation by entities globally
in the aftermath. The study will seek to determine the importance of doux commerce to
the evolutionary progression of societies and their economies during the eighteenth
century, its role in the dissolution of mercantilism, and its position in the rise of free trade
and industrial capitalism during the nineteenth century. The concept has only recently
been given attention in the historiography by academicians beginning in the late twentieth
century and has yet to receive an appropriate and multilayered consideration. Numerous
scholarly exertions from the early modern and modern periods were consulted to
formulate this corpus. Additionally, several letter books containing the epistolary
correspondence of merchants were researched to highlight the virtuous nature of this
system, its intersection amidst economic, social, and political landscapes, and the sheer
breadth of knowledge required to succeed in commercial activity. The effort begins with
a discussion of doux commerce from social to political and the governmental forms that
could either be hospitable or hostile to its tenets and practitioners. Subsequently, a
discussion of business manuals and occupational tutelage was needed to discern precisely
how the beliefs of doux commerce were instilled in commercial actors. The usage of
merchant letters as case studies underscores the values of this ethos and its dissemination
by transatlantic merchants in the mid-to-late eighteenth century. The final portion of this
labor reveals how laissez-faire intellectuals entwined doux commerce in their speeches
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and scholarship to advocate for peaceable international relations via the application of
free market principles. Doux commerce as a species of economic activity and a
commercial ethos, it was argued, positively affected individuals, businesses, and nations
by imparting its adherents with an altruistic egalitarianism. The conduct of the mercantile
order, it was further hoped, would tangibly alter the sensibilities of their respective
societies, and function to upend traditional notions of societal hierarchies. Doux
commerce was fused with the literary efforts and discourses of sociopolitical intellectuals
during the late eighteenth and early-to-mid nineteenth centuries. Its propagation at
economic, social, and political levels and the support of peace through free trade
destabilized the Establishment and eroded the position of those who had historically
benefitted from mercantilism. The theory of doux commerce accompanied a fundamental
transformation at economic, social, and political levels, one that emphasized the
inefficiencies of mercantilism and helped to generate the necessary environment for
commercial republicanism, industrial capitalism, and harmonious international relations
to flourish.
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1
Introduction
Montesquieu’s political theory of doux commerce occupies an intriguing position
in the historical dialectic. Although somewhat arcane to those outside of academia, it
offers an applicable code of conduct for business dealings and had relevant implications
for the economic, social, and political landscapes of early modern and modern Europe. It
is cosmopolitan in nature and is significant for hinting at the future importance of modern
political economy and international relations. In essence, the theory posits that commerce
encourages peace as it would strengthen the bonds of unity between nations rather than
tear them asunder. This work seeks to determine the social and intellectual origins of
Montesquieu’s doux commerce and delineate its representation as a species of economic
activity and as a commercial ethos. Republics were deemed to be hospitable to doux
commerce as they engaged in what Montesquieu termed economical commercial or the
judicious accumulation of capital. Contrarily, monarchies, especially tyrannical or
despotic ones, were determined to be hostile to doux commerce as they favored luxury
commerce which entailed the insatiable accumulation of capital without forethought of
the deleterious effects to future trade partnerships. The initial practitioners of this
commercial ethos, he believed, were virtuous merchants who had undergone a period of
tutelage with their masters to be taught those moral principles which were integral to the
establishment of fruitful and longstanding business collaborations. Their rectitude and
improved eruditeness as the eighteenth century progressed assisted in the formation of an
attenuated form of luxury that could be sought after without offending the sensibilities of
their countrymen. The aspiration for comforts and conveniences differed from the
aristocracy who pursued wealth for purposes of ostentation and profligacy. Rational
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pursuits of capital accumulation and social mobility challenged the unmerited stature of
societal elites and destabilized their position in the socioeconomic hierarchy. The
merchant’s primary mode of communication was letters. Epistolary correspondence
underscored their honorable comportment as well as the vast array of knowledge in a
multiplicity of fields and industries needed for success in the transatlantic commercial
ecosystem. The belief in the honorable conduct of these merchants was carried forward
into the nineteenth century by sociopolitical intellectuals who interwove the values of
doux commerce in their public dialogues and literary endeavors. These individuals helped
to illuminate the socioeconomic inefficiencies and inequities that had been created by
mercantilism. The advocation of peace through free trade materially altered economic,
social, and political arenas, creating a foundation whereby the principles of laissez-faire
trade theory and industrial capitalism might thrive in the modern period.

3
Chapter One: Social Concept to Political Theory
Montesquieu’s magnum opus Spirit of the Laws, first published in 1748, contains
a trove of social commentary relating to the political philosophy of early modern Europe.
While Montesquieu may be most famous for his advocation of the separation of powers
in a republican government to include the judiciary, a more elusive but equally important
theory is contained within books XX–XXII, those conveying his views on commerce,
trade, and money. Curiously, the phrase doux commerce is not overtly expressed in the
Spirit of the Laws, but historians and academicians have attributed this theory to
Montesquieu as it represents a unique composition of ethics. Specifically, doux
commerce espouses the strengthening of ties between commercial interests at individual
and governmental levels through certain virtues, arguing that its practitioners furthered
peace through trade rather than war. Although the term doux commerce was ridiculed by
Karl Marx due to occidental involvement in the slave trade during the early modern
period,1 it is contended that the theory possesses merit as a harbinger of the dissolution of
economic modalities and systems of government which promoted monopolism,
protectionism, and inefficiency, versus free market competition, and international
economic cohesion. To understand this commercial ethos which could be practiced at
local, regional, and national levels, the reader must first understand the origins of doux
commerce as a social concept among philosophes. As twentieth-century political
economist Albert O. Hirschman remarked, the origin of “the epithet doux is probably to
be had in the ‘noncommercial’ meaning of commerce: besides trade the word long
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Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for
Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 62.
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denoted animated and repeated conversation and other forms of polite social intercourse
and dealings among persons (frequently between two persons of the opposite sex).”2
An early illustration of doux commerce as a social phenomenon can be found in
Michel de Montaigne’s Essais, first published in 1580, where he perceives that “art is
nothing other than the counter-roll and the register of the production of such souls. It is
for me as sweet a commerce as that of beautiful and honest women”3 In this passage
Montaigne utilizes the French Controller General of Finances’ counter-roll as a metaphor
for the soul’s ability to create and enjoy art, while also exchanging novel ideas by way of
dialogue. His reflections underscore doux commerce’s early connection with agreeable
banter and hint at future instances where the social and financial realms would coalesce.
More than a century later, Voltaire also utilized the phrase in his comedy
L’Envieux (1738) further solidifying the discursive genesis of doux commerce:
I am happy without pomp and ambition. Without fate raising me up or casting me
down, I was born to enjoy a wise and sweet commerce, For you, for my friends,
for society. For a long time nothing has been wanting in my happiness: Your
noble friendship, on which my fate is based, for me takes the place of fortune and
the honors of the world.4
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Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 61.
“L’art n’est aultre chose que le contreroolle et le registre des productions de telles ames.
C’est aussi pour moy un doulx commerce que celuy des belles et honnestes femmes.”
Michel de Montaigne, Essais, 3 vols. (Paris: Nelson, 1913), 3:57.
4
“Je suis heureux sans faste et sans ambition. Sans que le sort m’élève et sans qu’il me
renverse, Je suis né pour jouir d’un sage et doux commerce, Pour vous, pour mes amis,
pour la société. Dès longtemps rien ne manque à ma félicité: Votre noble amitié, sur qui
mon sort se fonde, Me tient lieu de fortune et des honneurs du monde.” Voltaire,
L’Envieux, in Œuvres complètes de Voltaire, 52 vols., ed. by Louis Moland, vol. 3.2
(Paris: Garnier, 1877–1885), 556.
3
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The thespians in this portion of the play would forego both accolade and fortune to
engage in this “sweet commerce” or doux commerce. This species of intercourse appears
to elicit in Voltaire’s actors an air of temperance and restraint, contentment in friendship
without self-destructive ambition.
In Book XX of the Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu delineates what is meant by
doux commerce in its economic and political sense for both merchant and government
actors. He states that “commerce is a cure for the most destructive prejudices; for it is
almost a general rule, that wherever we find agreeable manners, there commerce
flourishes; and that wherever there is commerce there we meet with agreeable manners.”5
Doux commerce refines the manners and mores of barbarous nations by endowing its
practitioners with a code of conduct that emphasizes urbane deportment and business
decorum. The advantages of mutual commercial reciprocity between merchants and
nations in the exchange of various commodities is a primary catalyst for the creation of
peace between them.
Montesquieu argues that individuals embracing doux commerce produce this
commercial ethos by facilitating the construction of equitable trade practices among the
parties involved. Montesquieu relates that “the spirit of trade produces in the mind of a
man a certain sense of exact justice, opposite, on the one hand, to robbery, and on the
other to those moral virtues which forbid our always adhering rigidly to the rules of
private interest, and suffer us to neglect this for the advantage of others.”6 Ideally,
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Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent,
Hafner Library of Classics, no. 9 (New York: Hafner Pub., 1949), 316.
6
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 317.
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commodity exchange between entities would be guided by an evenhandedness, one that
considers the requests of both parties while simultaneously forgoing pursuits of irrational
self-interest and the deleterious traditions of avarice and theft.
Montesquieu distinguishes between two types of governments, monarchies, and
republics, to juxtapose the unique attributes of certain bureaucracies where one would
find what he determined to be luxury commerce and economical commerce. Republics
engaging in economical commerce favored commercial dominance as opposed to
political dominance. Montesquieu believed that the Dutch and English societies were
prominent examples of economical commerce where the ethos of doux commerce could
thrive. For a historical case study of economical commerce, one may turn to the Dutch
grain trade in the 1600s. The Dutch grain trade expanded tremendously in the Baltic
region during the seventeenth century, with profits totaling some 80 million gulden by
1658 while its trade with France was nearly 30 percent less at 58 million gulden.7 Of the
34,850 ships that Holland owned in 1634, 3,522 were taxed in the Baltic and the Dutch
sailed upwards of five times to various ports in the vicinity during seasonal expeditions.
The importance of this illustration in explicating economical commerce is not profit
maximization, but rather the frequency with which goods were ferried back and forth and
the rational pecuniary expectations of Dutch merchants. Remarking on the thought
processes of Dutch and English merchants, Montesquieu expounds that it sometimes
“happens that a nation, when engaged in an economical commerce, having need of the
merchandise of one country, which serves as a capital or stock for procuring the
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Francis J. Bowman, “Dutch Diplomacy and the Baltic Grain Trade, 1600–1660,” Pacific
Historical Review 5, no. 4 (1936): 338.
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commodities of another, is satisfied with making very little profit, and frequently none at
all, in trading with the former, in expectation of gaining greatly by the latter.”8 Dutch and
English merchants forewent the prospect of larger short term returns in order to foster
stronger trade networks with the hopes of augmenting both partnership and profit at a
later date. In Montesquieu’s eyes, the chief error of a monarchy regarding its commercial
activity was having its collective economic interests subverted by its political interests.
Montesquieu traced the historical origins of luxury commerce to the colonization
of the New World and the extraction of agricultural produce and precious metals by the
kingdoms of Portugal and Spain. Monarchies engaging in luxury commerce
disproportionately favor a select group of administrative and governmental elites that
expediate the political will of the ruler. International law professor Robert Howse
summarizes the principles of luxury commerce succinctly: “unlike economic commerce,
it is not so much based on reciprocity and competitive advantage as on the fantastic
consumption demands of a small ruling class, which cannot be satisfied within the
boundaries of the community that they rule.”9 Constitutional structures rooted in the
delegation of power to an absolute monarchy or aristocracy fundamentally abjures
equitable trade practices and inherently promotes hostility to merchants championing the
virtues of doux commerce. The purveyors of luxury commerce develop an insidious form
of wealth, one that exploits both land and people across the globe for purposes of political
conquest and dominion. Recounting the colonialism of the Spanish crown in the New

8

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 320.
Robert Howse, “Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace,” Brooklyn
Journal of International Law 31, no. 3 (2006): 702.
9
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World, historian K.N. Chaudhuri notes that “during the first 20 years of the sixteenth
century, some 15,000 kg of gold arrived from the New World. Gold imports continued to
expand until the peak was reached in 1551–60.”10 Practitioners of luxury commerce
retain a preponderance of both fixed and movable wealth and when their resources are
deemed insufficient, they extricate themselves from their own insolvency by subjugating
foreign peoples, producing enemies rather than allies in the process.
A primary reason that doux commerce was thought to resonate most optimally in
republican governments engaging in economical commerce was because agents of this
commercial ethos would not perceive money as a device to achieve ostentation and
profligacy, but as a means by which to complete transactions. Specie was one of the
principal instruments in the language of business dealings and the creation of credit
networks provided a medium for money to be utilized in its ideal form. Commercial
interests and concurrent need for equitable trade relations saw agents become
dispassionate conduits for stimulating gradual economic growth. Overarching financial
institutions such as banks, credit systems, and merchant houses did not thrive in absolute
governments because of its paradoxical attitude towards financial interworkings.
Regarding the banking systems of oppressive kingdoms, Montesquieu notes that the
“erecting of banks in countries governed by an absolute monarch supposes money on the
one side, and on the other power: that is…the means of procuring everything, without any
power; and…the power, without any means of procuring at all…for the same reason, all
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K. N. Chaudhuri, “Precious Metals and Mining in the New World: 1500–1800,”
European Review 2, no. 4 (1994): 264.
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associations of merchants…are seldom proper in absolute governments.” Merchants,
agents of finance, and institutions practicing the beliefs of doux commerce would be
stifled at every turn by the crown who could requisition wealth at any juncture to fund illadvised spending and extravagant behavior.
Montesquieu’s political theory of doux commerce increased the virtuous nature of
commerce itself and its adherents. The expansion of commercial activities between both
individuals and societies directly correlated to an augmentation of placidity among
entities. According to Hirschman, Montesquieu believed that the implications for a
citizenry engaging in economical commercial activity and the ethos of doux commerce
were equally significant with respect to cultural and political evolutions. Quoting an
excerpt from the Spirit of the Laws, Hirschman underscores that “the spirit of commerce
brings with it the spirit of frugality, of economy, of moderation, of work, of wisdom, of
tranquility, of order, and of regularity. In this manner, as long as this spirit prevails, the
riches it creates do not have any bad effect.”12 Hirschman made certain to convey
Montesquieu’s emphasis on the moral reinvention these characteristics offered their
devotees. The benefits of economical commerce were correlated in part to the utilization
of bills of exchange which disconnected emotion from capital accumulation. The
unbridled passions of luxury commerce ran in contradistinction to economical commerce
which focused instead on the interests or the levelheaded pursuit of wealth accrual,
devoid of avarice. For Montesquieu, the impartial ecosystem that doux commerce
nurtured becomes jeopardized in a governmental form where a monarchy’s corrupted
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Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 322.
Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 71.
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form of despotism exists. In a despotic government, commodities, specie, and even
persons are subject to apprehension. At a whim of the monarch, fixed and moveable
wealth are susceptible to confiscation, endangering a primary objective of commercial
enterprise.
The immoral nobility in a monarchical government, unmoved by doux commerce,
have the power to sequester trade centers at any moment, directly undermining
mercantile endeavors. Utilizing the kingdoms of Portugal and Castille as case studies,
Montesquieu communicates that when the “Portuguese and Castilians bore sway in the
East Indies, commerce had such opulent branches that their princes did not fail to seize
them. This ruined their settlements in those parts of the world.”13 For monarchical
governments, doux commerce and its devices are impractical because they separate the
passions of political dominion from commercial activities. Absolute governmental forms
encourage tyrannical kings and princes to engage in what historian Paul Cheney has
termed “an extractive form of court capitalism.”14 In the wake of settlement repossession
and trade post restructuring, bureaucratic representatives of the monarchy were seldom
trusted by the merchant order in port arms such as the city of Goa.15 These commercial
agents were want to be acquainted with the interests of doux commerce and the monetary
instruments that facilitated temperance such as the bill of exchange. Laws permitting the
ignominious members of the nobility to engage in commercial activity, coupled with
unfamiliarity of mercantile tradecraft, were potential catalysts for the dissolution of the
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Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 326.
Paul Burton Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French
Monarchy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 68.
15
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courtly elite because they had not been educated under a merchant apprenticeship where
the civic virtues of doux commerce were promulgated.
The success of doux commerce in certain commercial ecosystems is due in part to
an important distinction in the bureaucratic disposition between republican styles of
governments and monarchical governments, specifically in their attitude towards fixed
and movable wealth. Regarding the nature of capital, Montesquieu clarifies that riches
“consist either in lands or in movable effects. The soil of every country is commonly
possessed by the natives…but movable effects, as money, notes, bills of exchange, stocks
in companies, vessels…belong to the whole world in general; in this respect, it is
composed of but one single state, of which all societies upon earth are members.”16
Montesquieu, as with the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza before him, preferred
movable wealth over fixed wealth because the amount of movable wealth that could be
accrued far exceeded that of fixed wealth. In republican governments where doux
commerce was prevalent and commercial sanctuary vouchsafed, accumulation of
movable assets was considered a nonthreatening endeavor and even increased the
cosmopolitan internationality of a society. Wealth provision in a republican government
dealing in movable assets was perceived as virtually limitless and created an
interdependence between individuals and governments that promoted a mutual
commercial reciprocity. Contrarily, in monarchical governments such as the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth dealing primarily in fixed wealth, the landed elite held large
swaths of immovable assets in the form of land and oversaw the production and
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Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 328.
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distribution of its movable commodities such as corn. On Poland, Montesquieu recounts
that “some of the lords possess entire provinces; they oppress the husbandmen, in order
to have greater quantities of corn, which they send to strangers, to procure the
superfluous demands of luxury. If Poland had no foreign trade, its inhabitants would be
happier. The grandees, who would have only their corn, would give it to their peasants.”17
A monarchical government, whose entrepreneurial tendencies are inclined towards luxury
commerce, gives rise to a select group of administrative and bureaucratic elites that
possess a disproportionate percentage of fixed wealth in a society. Additionally, they
export and hoard the produce extracted from fixed assets as evinced by Montesquieu’s
case study of Eastern Europe with regards to their agricultural industries. Not only are
movable assets and instruments such as bills of exchange integral to the success of doux
commerce, but an adequate level of security for the citizenry is necessary to prevent
rapacious despots from seizing neighboring lands.
The exigencies propounded by Montesquieu in Spirit of the Laws for a peaceable
equilibrium to exist within the polity to promote the cultivation of doux commerce as a
commercial ethos arose in part from the work of the abbé de Saint-Pierre years earlier in
his treatise Projet pour render la paix perpetuelle en Europe, first published in 1712. The
abbé had inspired the French philosophe by investigating existent systems of government
and had assisted Montesquieu in identifying the differences between monarchies and
republics as well as economical commerce and luxury commerce through his framework
of permanent and impermanent societies in Europe. Whereas permanent societies are
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guided by pragmatism, allowing for the development of political economy and the
organic expansion of commercial enterprise, impermanent societies applied militaristic
force to exert their influence or augment their landed assets. Utilizing the royal houses of
Habsburg and Bourbon as case studies, the abbé denotes that the “Equilibrium of Power
between the House of France and the House of Austria, cannot procure any Sufficient
Security either for the Preservation of Territory, or for the Preservation of Commerce.”18
The inadequacy of previously constructed monarchical constitutions engendered
uncertainty for the laity because a disproportionate ownership of fixed capital and the
movable commodities extracted therefrom could be reappropriated or exported as the
rulers saw fit. Furthermore, if a sudden deficiency of movable wealth arose from a
mismanagement of fixed resources, adjacent territories faced insecurities regarding their
physical safety and prospects of military conquest at the hands of more powerful
kingdoms. For Montesquieu, the remedy was the adoption of republican governments
that assured civil liberty protections and offered environments that provided opportunities
for wealth creation and encouraged doux commerce. During their financial endeavors,
merchants that utilized instruments such as the bill of exchange and exploited arbitrage in
foreign exchange rates were eschewing the corrosive byproducts of monarchies such as
rash decision making and violent outbursts. Instead, they implemented the tools of their
tradecraft to underscore how the commercial aspects of a republic could drastically
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outperform a monarchy that did not possess a system of checks and balances on absolute
authority.
At the outset of Book XXI in Spirit of the Laws, an intriguing postulation is made
for the existence of different governments across the globe and their disposition towards
doux commerce and various species of trade in general. For Montesquieu, societies were
inherently predisposed to certain governmental forms based upon indigenous climate
phenomena. The arid weather in more southern climates generated both indolence and
cruelty in these individuals. Although precious metals abounded in these regions, the
people found themselves amidst expansive tracts of land that were far from arable and
devoid of both industry and arts. Sparsely populated communities were susceptible to
despotism because the dearth of infrastructure increased the likelihood of conquest at the
hands of tyrants and their regimes. The authoritarian rulers and the lethargy of their
people arising from an insufficient want of exogenous commodities was contrasted by the
European nations of the north. On the nature of Europe, Montesquieu communicates that
“there is a kind of balance between the southern and northern nations. The first have
every convenience of life, and few of its wants: the last have many wants, and a few
conveniences…the equilibrium is maintained by the laziness of the southern nations, and
by the industry and activity which she has given to those in the North.”19 Desire for
external merchandise created a need for civil liberty protections in the industrious north
to possess the opportunity to procure these commodities while supporting governmental
structures that protected doux commerce and the virtuous spirit of commercial activity.

19
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While the commercial ethos of doux commerce is inherently fragile as it thrives
most optimally in certain societies, it displays a particular resiliency in its ability to find
safe haven transnationally. On the mutability of trade, Montesquieu conveys that
“commerce is sometimes destroyed by conquerors, sometimes cramped by monarchs; it
traverses the earth, flies from the places where it is oppressed, and stays where it has
liberty to breathe: it reigns…where nothing was formerly to be seen but deserts, seas, and
rocks; and where it once reigned now there are only deserts.”20 The history of doux
commerce represents a societal dialectic, a delicate balance between the practitioners of
this mercantile ethos and governments that could either defend commercial activity or
harbor animosity towards their merchants and institutions. The temperament of a
government towards doux commerce originates in part from its disposition towards
commercial expansion, capital accumulation, and the direction of societal progress.
Whereas a despotic government will suppress commerce, requisition property, and
subdue its citizens, a republican government possesses countervailing forces that check
absolute authority through a separation of powers. Divvying bureaucratic responsibilities
quells the passions of corrupted political leaders and places the unobtrusive interests at
the forefront of societal concern. Domestic trepidations arising from the consequences of
transnational economic expansion stimulated the dialectic regarding nascent conceptions
of international relations during the eighteenth century. Hirschman expresses that
“international commerce, being a transaction between nations, could conceivably have
also a direct impact on the likelihood of peace and war: once again the interests might
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overcome the passions, specifically the passion for conquest.” While the French
statesman Jean-Baptiste Colbert and the English economist Sir Josiah Child had outlined
that commercial expansion necessarily produces continuous tension, combat, and the
displacement of societies, Montesquieu’s friend and contemporary Jean-François Melon
claimed in 1734 that the spirits of commerce and conquest were mutually exclusive with
respect to the affairs of nations.22
The evolution of eighteenth-century attitudes towards the internationalization of
commercial activity and the propagation of doux commerce was not without misgivings.
Montesquieu’s praise of doux commerce as a catalyst for peaceful relations between
individuals and nations was juxtaposed with an air of hesitation. He also considered that
improved commodity exchange might cause societies to monetize the entirety of human
interaction. Hirschman mentions that “in the same chapter in which he commends
commerce for its contribution to peace, he regrets the way in which commerce brings
with it a monetization of all humans relations and the loss of hospitality and of other
‘moral virtues which lead one to not always discuss one’s interests with rigidity.’”23 For
Montesquieu, commerce was a double-edged sword. It could simultaneously temper the
passions of conquest and fervor in hostile rulers while also removing the humanistic
element from interpersonal relationships. The peace, serenity, and fair dealings offered by
Montesquieu’s doux commerce were bolstered by technical innovations in commercial
activity such as the exploitation of arbitrage and the utilization of bills of exchange but
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could be swiftly undermined by neglecting adherence to a code of altruism. While
Montesquieu had exhibited diverse concerns related to the destabilization of doux
commerce, his friend Jean-François Melon was more optimistic. For Melon, the
expansion of international commercial activity and of trade networks strengthened the
principles of economical commerce and of doux commerce. Aided by advances in
navigational technologies such as the compass, courageous enterprise thrived because the
merchants of seafaring nations became emboldened on their perilous voyages, which in
turn served to reinforce the moral imperatives of doux commerce.
A society’s governmental form, economic modality, and disposition towards doux
commerce can be inferred by its commercial activity as well as its agricultural and
industrial production. The ancient empires of Asia had maximized their trade
opportunities through advantageous proximity to the seas, selling numerous commodities
that they produced such as silk and tea, thereby bringing immense wealth to the
emperors. Japan, however, had possessed all the necessary agricultural and commercial
requirements for a thriving population internally. Similarly, “the Egyptians…who by
their religion and their manners were averse to all communication with strangers—had
scarcely at that time any foreign trade. They enjoyed a fruitful soil and great plenty. Their
country was the Japan of those times; it possessed everything within itself.”24 Progressive
and sustainable development of a society’s economic infrastructure, coupled with the
frequency of internal and external commercial activity are integral elements to the
success or failure of its civilization. These phenomena can also be indicative of its

24

Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 336.

18
participation in luxury commerce versus economical commerce and whether an exclusive
sect of society benefits from its commercial interests or if wealth provision exists for a
greater percentage of the citizenry. Montesquieu notes that “while the empires of Asia
enjoyed the commerce of luxury, the Tyrians had the commerce of economy, which they
extended throughout the world.”25 Therefore, the extent of national or colonial
boundaries, in tandem with the species and quality of merchant culture, are equally
significant to the creation of commercial arrangements and governmental structures.
A nation’s estimation of doux commerce and its own commercial efforts varies
dramatically based upon its bureaucratic form and sociopolitical stratification. From the
ancient territories of the Romans to the monarchies of early modern Europe, commerce
was often viewed as a necessary but odious undertaking by members of the court. The
invasion of the Roman Empire by more barbarous nations led to the destruction of
commerce and, according to Montesquieu, the nobility took no issue with its
devastation.26 The pursuit of commercial dominance and inoffensive capital accumulation
was, perhaps, an unintended consequence of and reaction to longstanding elitist
paradigms. The aristocracy believed that it was above participating in the loathsome
activities of commercial exchange and Hirschman suggests that “when the faith in this
ideal had been severely shaken and the ‘hero’ had been ‘demolished,’ the long-maligned
trader did not correspondingly rise in prestige: the idea that he was a mean, grubby, and
uninspiring fellow lingered for a long time.”27 The mythos of the valiant merchant had
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dissipated over time and the mundane trader was perceived by the ruling class in early
modern Europe as of ignoble birth and hierarchically inferior. Monarchical
representatives believed that force, rather than the virtues propounded by doux
commerce, was a greater asset to amassing personal fortunes and that routine commercial
interests were of little worth. Economic pursuits in absolute governments were hindered
by harboring unfounded prejudicial customs and mores concerning the value of their own
commercial activity. The success of doux commerce and innocuous capital accumulation
in European republics was due in part to monarchical derision of international
commercial dominance and ridiculing the purported benefits of expansive trade networks
to their respective kingdoms.
The advent of doux commerce in early modern Europe can be understood by
examining the distinctions between societies favoring commercial dominance and
political dominance and the efforts of each to safeguard the public or private interests.
The kingdoms of Spain and Portugal had voyaged to the New World and the East Indies,
conquering the inhabitants, and colonizing the territories. Montesquieu expresses that
“the Spaniards considered these new-discovered countries as the subject of conquest;
while others…found them to be the proper subjects of commerce…several nations…have
given a kind of sovereignty to companies of merchants, who…have made a great
accessory power without embarrassing the principal state.”28 Monarchies favoring
political dominance severely regulated and hindered their own commercial evolution by
stifling the degree of autonomy that was granted to their own mercantile representatives,
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preferring military force rather than commercial reciprocity. The Dutch and English
however, favoring commercial dominance, bestowed a large degree of self-governance to
their companies because they understood the value of these trade outposts as expediating
the procurement of commodities for their citizens while developing and increasing
exchange networks. Provided that capital accumulation is executed in a modest and
reasonable manner, it is not incompatible with the civic virtues embraced by doux
commerce. The utilization of money in its real or ideal form, i.e., precious metals versus
bills of exchange and credit networks, are equally important to ascertaining a society’s
governmental architecture, the success or failure of that system, and the values
reproduced by its merchants.
After conquering and colonizing the New World, the kingdom of Spain extracted
and transported back to the European continent tremendous quantities of gold and silver.
However, these riches were characteristically inferior because the type of wealth tied to
this form of specie is physically burdensome and ephemeral with regards to its real and
perceived value as it becomes more available to the public. Spain’s precipitous decline
was chronicled by Montesquieu who observed that “the Spaniards raked into the
mines…invented machines to…break the ore, and separate it; and as they sported with
the lives of the Indians, they forced them to labor without mercy. The specie of Europe
soon doubled, and the profit of Spain diminished in the same proportion.”29 Although
these metals are more durable and represent a form of currency, the multiplication and
debasement of these commodities directly contributed to their devaluation. While the
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kingdom of Spain had avoided labor expenditures by enslaving native populations, their
overhead related to mining infrastructure and shipping dramatically increased. As the
quantities of their specie burgeoned on the European continent, its value plummeted
simultaneously with their profit margins, and they operated at a growing deficit. Not only
had the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal miscalculated with respect to the type of money
they desired, but they also encouraged barbarism through the practices of slavery and
subjugation.
The creation of bills of exchange, credit networks, and lending upon interest are
all examples of money being utilized in its ideal form. Doux commerce prospers in
societies that implement these mechanisms because the instruments and methods assist in
mitigating the covetous nature of its mercantile actors. Governments engaging in
economical commerce apply the commercial ethos of doux commerce to arrive at an
idyllic stability for their enterprises and an equilibrium of personal security for their
citizens domestically. Regarding the illustrative and symbolic nature of coinage and other
forms of physical money, Montesquieu demonstrates keen insight by perceiving that
these are “the sign of the value of merchandise” while “paper is the sign of the value of
specie.”30 A republic is most optimally equipped to facilitate international commercial
activity because their merchants are not laden with enormous sums of physical bullion
such as gold and silver that are degraded as quantities increase. Paper notes are carried on
nautical voyages to express larger transactions without overburdening vessels, enabling a
greater number of contracts to be executed simultaneously, while disincentivizing piracy
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because the cargo is elsewhere. Foreign countries are more inclined to trade with nations
such as the Dutch and English because their exchange networks are more equitable and
secure. The representation of money in its ideal form utilized in an economical
commercial ecosystem are both elements of and evidence for the successful
implementation of the civic virtues that doux commerce promotes in its devotees.
While the Dutch and English were judicious in preferring economical commerce,
their acceptance and cultivation of mercantilism presented numerous challenges for the
prospective survival of doux commerce and the success of its adherents. Namely,
governments involved in mercantilist activity disproportionately favored a particular
assemblage of elites across the administrative and commercial realms who reinforced the
domestic position of its political leaders. The creation of biased laws and the application
of imbalanced import tariffs against foreign nations benefitted a select group of
individuals while burdening the majority with higher taxes, elevated food prices, and a
substandard existence. The repeal of prejudicial commercial laws and the rebalancing of
socioeconomic inequalities was spearheaded by the sociopolitical intelligentsia in the late
eighteenth and early-to-mid nineteenth centuries that championed the principles of doux
commerce and international peace through free trade.
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Chapter Two: Commercial Tutelage and the Evolution of Business Culture
Having outlined the social heritage of doux commerce, it is prudent to examine
certain didactic materials related to the mercantile beginnings of this commercial ethos.
Early modern business manuals, especially Jacques Savary’s Le parfait négociant first
published in 1675, served as a formidable source of inspiration for Montesquieu’s
political theory. The merchant handbook, which experienced numerous reprints and
revisions during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was a principal source of
influence and information for prospective merchants from diverse backgrounds. Savary
had been a successful French merchant in the late seventeenth century under the reign of
Louis XIV and gradually came to advise the monarchy on questions of economic policy
and commercial law.
For Savary, in order to succeed in commercial activity, it was necessary for one to
undergo an apprenticeship with a seasoned professional to discover the nuances of
mercantile tradecraft and gain understanding from their experiences. At the outset of his
work, Savary conveys that “Ignorance, Recklessness, and the Ambition of Merchants
usually cause bankruptcy, in order to instill in them the desire to make themselves
capable of Commerce, before undertaking it, and wise and prudent in their trade.”31
These inadvisable merchant characteristics could quickly lead to an inexperienced
trader’s financial ruin.
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Enterprise is potentially advantageous for individual merchants, their societies,
and the world at large. However, pursuit of capital accumulation in an injudicious manner
may lead to financial insolvency. Ostensibly, ambition can be a beneficial trait for the
hopeful tradesman as it involves hard work and determination. Nevertheless, ambition
may run contrary to the principles of doux commerce because the appetites of the
unproven trader are inclined toward desires for immediate affluence. Regarding the
misplaced aspirations of certain corrupted mercantile actors, Jacques Savary delineates
that “the ambition of the Merchants, and the desire that they have to make a fortune in a
short time, also cause bankruptcies, because this covetousness leads them inconsiderately
to lend to all comers, and particularly to the Nobility, who only pay when it pleases him,
and…young people who have not yet reached the age of twenty-five.”32 The naïveté
stemming from unfamiliarity with tradecraft and a lack of rapport with fellow merchants
within the commercial landscape encourages imprudent and reckless capital
accumulation, leading inexperienced merchants to offer loans indiscriminately. This is
especially devastating when traders choose to trust the aristocracy and unseasoned
individuals less than twenty-five, the former infrequently repaying their loans and the
latter abrogating their fiduciary responsibilities due to recurrent instances of financial
desolation.
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Inadvisable lending and the passions synonymous with the practices of luxury
commerce, Savary argues, arise from ignorance and not having learned the values of
doux commerce from an appropriate mercantile apprenticeship. Savary notes that “the
ignorance of the traders comes from the fact that in their beginning they lacked
education, not having done their apprenticeship with skilled Merchants who have all the
qualities required to show the Trade well.”33 Refusing mentorship with an experienced
trader or truncating a suitable period of tutelage is deleterious to the future success of
prospective merchants because they may be foregoing absorption of vital aspects of
tradecraft such as recognizing the quality of merchandise, the ability to properly measure
length and width of materials, identifying which commodities are integral to the
production of certain goods, how to correctly keep accounts via single and double entry
bookkeeping, how to calculate interest and exchange rates, and how to use bills of
exchange. Ignoring cultivation and refinement of merchant skillsets may lead to the
formation of substandard merchant classes, whose values can hinder their own success
and be detrimental to the economic health and prosperity of their respective societies.
Savary further argues that indiscretion and inconsideration in the execution of
mercantile affairs may also lead to personal financial insolvency. While itemizing
manifests and shipments, Savary cautions that commercial actors should not overburden
themselves with physical commodities as it could interfere with the finalizing of contracts
between entities. He states that “the imprudence of the traders still causes their
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misfortune, when they load themselves with too many goods, and beyond their strength,
because it is a ‘dead fund’ which produces nothing and which causes delays in late
payments, for the continuation of which they pay large interest.”34 For those merchants
with pecuniary sagacity, a ‘dead fund’ encompassed the idea that financial capital
accrued interest, while physical inventory stored in warehouses did not. Savary also
exhibits a certain prescience with regards to the facets of both economical commerce and
luxury commerce outlined by Montesquieu years later in the Spirit of the Laws.
Specifically, he predicts that a far greater quantity of financial capital may be transported
globally than the finite resources extracted from fixed wealth. Whereas the physical
commodities borne of fixed assets such as corn and precious metals requires concerted
efforts as well as a large cohort of vessels to ferry transnationally, financial capital in the
form of bills of exchange and promissory notes do not tax the merchant beyond his
capacities while providing him with a greater deal of liquidity. This is significant because
a failure to deliver commodities in a timely manner directly and adversely impacted a
merchant’s reputation which was integral to their credit and ability to borrow in the early
modern period.
According to Savary, prospective understudies of seasoned merchants must not be
compelled to enter the industry of commercial activity. Conversely, prospective acumen
and prowess in commercial endeavors can be identified during adolescence in the form of
spontaneous curiosity and inclination towards the mercantile profession. It is
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counterproductive for parents to force their children into commerce as their coercion may
later produce deficiencies in the tradesman’s moral character and value system. An adept
merchant must demonstrate a profound ingenuity; “It consists in inventing new fabrics, in
being pleasant to buy, in sale, & in negotiating business: in being subtle & quick to
respond with natural arguments, when one finds faults: know well how to write,
Arithmetic, & other things necessary for the mercantile profession.”35 A formative
creativity identified by the family during their progeny’s youth would prove to be
fundamental in discerning whether their child may be a successful candidate to study
mercantile tradecraft. Successful merchants ultimately needed to possess a multifaceted
skillset and an acute knowledge in a wide range of industries related to commercial
activity in order to prosper.
In the wake of their agreement to an apprenticeship with a seasoned professional,
Savary emphasizes that there are several essential factors that the trainee must possess or
learn at the outset. The first element is a firm theistic devotion to God. Through faith,
Savary posits that the supreme being may at intervals bestow favor upon the merchant
during commercial activity. A lapse of religious conviction may cause the divine to
denounce the commercial actor, leading to subsequent circumstances of misfortune. The
second trait an apprentice must exhibit is an unwavering fidelity towards their master. In
exchange for the valuable time and energy that the master dispenses to train understudies,
students are obliged to commit themselves wholly to their mentors with a steadfast
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loyalty to their instructions. The third characteristic is trust. The apprentice should
maintain an unfaltering reliance upon the merchant professional and a conviction that
their teachings are altruistic, “provided that the things which will be commanded to them
are not against the service of God, and their conscience.”36
After completing the necessary period of tutelage and conforming to the statutes
required by law, novice merchants devoted several years to fulfilling the role of assistant
and porter for their masters. Their primary tasks entailed securing commodities and
ferrying goods to their respective parties, acting as both conduit and facilitator.
Remarking on this introductory period, Savary mentions that “the first two years they are
only employed to know the merchandise, to serve it, & to carry it to their Masters, & to
the other Factors who already make the trade capable, to show it to those who want to
buy it, & to carry it again to the people to whom it was sold.”37 This initial phase was
marked by a fusion of educational and practical elements, both of which were integral
aspects to a profitable merchant career while fulfilling the principles of what
Montesquieu would later term doux commerce. A proper mentorship will have instructed
the pupil in relevant and useful facets of mercantile conduct and culture, adorning the
mind with enlightened reason and pertinent information. Applicable experience and
suitable management of their endeavors gave rise to formidable aptitude during
occupational activities, gradually reducing missteps, honing knowledge, and ensuring
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prolonged success. While Savary had delineated a universal archetype between mentor
and understudy for merchant professionals in Le parfait négociant, his discussion was
necessarily limited to the individual and practical elements of commercial proceedings.
Subsequent authors developed Savary’s blueprint for commercial achievement to include
civic duties and the cultivation of relationships and reputation with those individuals not
involved in the marketplace.
It is of the utmost importance that fledgling merchants be mindful of their role as
citizens within society. A seasoned commercial professional will have imparted the moral
virtues mirroring those of doux commerce to their trainees while also lecturing the
aspiring commercial actor about the perils of irrational self-interest and disregard for the
overall wellbeing of others. Writing in the mid-to-late eighteenth century towards the end
of the Seven Years’ War, the anonymous author of the “Essai sur l’éducation du
négociant,” an apposite essay penned in serial form housed within the Journal de
commerce et d’agriculture, built upon the principles outlined by Savary in Le parfait
négociant concerning the moral requirements necessary for successful commercial
enterprise while also expanding upon the merchant’s role in civil society.
The author notes that “above all, our young man must be warned…that he is a
member of a political body, & that in this capacity he must contribute to the common
good, seek everything that can provide real advantages to society, & avoid anything that
can disconcert its harmony and disturb its tranquility & good order.”38 Mitigating
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injurious ambitions, willful ignorance, and financial indiscretions while employing
consideration, honesty, loyalty, and a proper work ethic will improve the merchant’s
ability to harness their teachings to better serve the people. A merchant whose career is in
its nascency must champion an egalitarian mindset, adhering to the models put forth by
their predecessors that will defend and enhance the public welfare. As the selfless actions
of the trader are replicated throughout the body politic, their own personal fortunes will
be augmented in turn.
Merchants of the highest order are those whose values reflect doux commerce and
the economical accumulation of capital. Magnanimity begets reciprocity; when humanity
benefits from the fruits of their labor, other sects of society wish for their trade
representatives to be rewarded in turn. It is precisely through their expertise and
familiarity with a variety of industries that the merchant accomplishes this feat. The
reader learns that “the Merchant is not an Individual confined to the narrow circle of his
domestic details, to the usual facility of the ever-present calculation of his particular
interest. He should not be confused with the Retailer, who sees only his interest &
nothing beyond, who hears, knows & follows only one object.”39 The merchant is
differentiated from the retailer in that the manifold abilities and virtuous nature he
inherits from his mentor enables a greater breadth of knowledge, worldliness, and
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universality of perspective than the retailer. The secular experiences garnered through
travel and interpersonal communication during business activities bequeaths to the
merchant superior advantages in trade, allowing for greater success in both the public and
private spheres. Although specialized in their respective commodities, the retailer may
hinder commercial and societal evolutions because of their bridled focus.
The inexperienced merchant is prepared by his master to be a constructive
reflection of the body politic, and an international citizen well versed in a multitude of
activities and business practices. The merchant should retain similar adroitness in
commercial endeavors as those whose contributions to the sciences and elsewhere have
resounded so extraordinarily throughout the early modern period. He applies the same
“genius that the Lockes & Newtons employ in the sciences. He meditates, he weighs, he
measures, he calculates, he combines ideas, he discusses principles, he develops
complicated objects, he knows the causes of variations in exchange rates, which he often
foresees, and the dangers of the seas, of which he knows how to appreciate the risks.”40
Business practices infused with doux commerce nurture the creation of vast global
economic structures. These industrial ecosystems benefit both the individual trader and
society at large by revealing to its people the distinct customs, laws, manners, mores, and
tastes of diverse nations internationally. Adept merchants assist in the development of a
class of economic actors that comprises an intermediary body of commerce. An
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intermediary body of merchants consists of an assemblage of businesspeople that
Montesquieu purported to act as conciliators between a government and its citizenry.
This corpus promulgates the values of doux commerce abroad while conveying novel
concepts and ideas garnered from global transactions overseas to its citizens domestically
in order to improve social and financial acuity.
The practice of doux commerce among merchants individually and as an
intermediary body collectively, contributed to the generation of methodical trade and
political economy. The merchant “foresees abundance, famine, war & peace, the causes
of credit & public discredit, & directs its operations accordingly. He knows men inside
out, & it is not uncommon to see a Merchant penetrate a letter from a Correspondent,
although skillfully written, the secret of his affairs.”41 Before the advent of modern banks,
more interwoven credit networks, and larger merchant houses beginning in the nineteenth
century, an individual’s ability to secure personal loans was based largely upon their
reputation. Accordingly, sensible merchants remained ever mindful of their conduct as
individual traders and as proprietors within their occupational realms. The laborious
efforts to secure and maintain continuous professional correspondence shaped the future
for merchants seeking rewarding partnerships between mutual business interests.
Meticulously crafted epistolary communication was one of the lynchpins for successful
enterprise and the value system of doux commerce bequeathed by mentors to their
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protégés was integral in fortifying these mercantile relationships both locally and
transnationally. Routine interaction with both foreign and domestic partners in tandem
with awareness of contemporary international affairs enabled perceptive merchants to
make useful extrapolations, executing shrewd business decisions related to the price of
goods, currency exchange rates, and allocation of resources.
Although expansion of communication networks and capital accumulation are
some of the primary objectives of the trader, mercantile adherents of doux commerce
remained conscientious of their responsibility as educators to non-commercial members
of their societies, championing and defending the interests of the people in concert with
their own. A truly dexterous merchant, having immersed themselves in the teachings of
their seasoned advisor, maintained civic virtue and integrity at all intervals. The ideal
merchant was simultaneously a “zealous Citizen, an enlightened & honest judge, a good
parent, a faithful friend, such finally that he must be in the eyes of his Compatriots his
supervisors, to become the first magistrate of his city, the father of the country…who is
better able than him to appreciate the faults against the public and particular interest?”42
Over the course of their travels, merchants garnered both social and economic insights
from local and international voyages, harnessing their perspicacity to become arbiters of
truth and fair dealings. Auspicious merchants enhanced their acuity in both the public and
private spheres by acquiring positions as interlocutors within the commercial dialectic.
As the merchant’s position of financial intermediary developed both endogenously and
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exogenously, their honorable reputation became more well known. Foregoing detrimental
practices of luxury commerce and the irrational pursuits of immoderation while
supporting interests at local, regional, and national levels caused his contemporaries to
regard his efforts with greater esteem and he eventually ascended to the role of primus
inter pares.
According to the nature of their profession, virtuous merchants observing the
ethos of doux commerce inevitably networked with an array of individuals both at home
and abroad. Principled traders took great care to remain distinguished commercial experts
and respected mediators in the financial realm. The enticements of luxury commerce and
the allure of ostentatious behavior, however, intermittently persuaded unethical
merchants to seek initiation into Les Grands. The reader observes that the corrupt
“Merchants who indulge in this ambition have generally been condemned in France. This
species of desertion from a profession to which they owe their fortune has been regarded
as a great obstacle to the progress of state commerce, because this desertion diminishes
the funds of commerce and the number of merchants.”43 An undisciplined or improperly
trained commercial actor may become enraptured by the thought of joining Les Grands
and partaking in its members’ grandiose appetites. However, these misdirected ambitions
were injurious to society as they detracted from the efficacy of the merchant order by
siphoning members from one stratification to another. Commercially altruistic objectives
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executed by merchants uplifted all citizens, enriching both the individual trader as well as
the body politic. Contrarily, if regimented merchants are continuously pilfered from their
social order, the entirety of the nation will be upended. Upheavals will manifest
themselves in the socioeconomic strata, and poverty, one of the true enemies of society,
will run rampant, causing famine, war, and privation.
While the author of the “Essai sur l’éducation du négociant” argues that the
merchant should remain unadulterated by the luxurious proclivities of the aristocracy, he
should nevertheless be made aware of the various governmental forms that offer
sanctuary for economical commerce, reciprocal financial enrichment, and systematic
capital accumulation. Through his ventures with business contacts in other parts of the
world, he becomes increasingly conscious of societies that are either hospitable to trade
or hostile to its execution. Although commerce exists in various arrangements globally,
its strength may be harnessed or hampered by the interests of those in power. Europe
serves as a preeminent case study for the universality of commerce and its different
iterations. For the commercial undertakings of the judicious merchant to be prosperous,
“he must first travel the entire globe, then stop successively at the examination of the
different branches of commerce, which Europe, and a single City of Europe, Amsterdam,
does with all the parts of the known world…. Some Merchants neglect it, because they
believe it foreign or indifferent to the success of practical science.”44 Ill-informed
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merchants, acting upon self-imposed restrictions, may deem it unnecessary to notate
commercial idiosyncrasies as well as the bureaucratic archetypes within which they
operate. However, disregarding the nuances of both economic and governmental
structures hinders the merchant’s discernment of communities that may be welcoming or
unfriendly to trade. If the merchant remains engulfed solely in the practical elements of
his profession, he fetters himself with ignorance. A successful trader must be equally
concerned with the characteristics of societies globally and how they are organized. A
merchant accomplishes this feat in part through first-hand experience, traveling to foreign
settings and utilizing the faculties that have been refined during his tenure as a mercantile
acolyte to analyze the differences between monarchies and republics.
As civic virtues were propagated, practical elements of their profession
implemented, and commercial arrangements scrutinized, the mercantile actor evolved to
become an ambassador of doux commerce globally. The trader became emblematic of a
new method of commercial activity, which contrasted markedly from the mercantilist
ecosystems and luxury commerce that had been nurtured by European sovereigns since
the late seventeenth century. Enlightenment philosophes began to acknowledge in the
aftermath of the Seven Years’ War that France’s commercial practices had indeed grown
unscrupulous. According to historian John Shovlin, while acknowledging that luxury
commerce had introduced exploitation, “they separated luxury conceptually from
commerce and, while continuing to validate trade, placed the blame for a dangerous
luxury on political economic institutions, and finally on the monarchy.”45 Trade
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monopolies bestowed by the monarchy to the guilds, they claimed, gave rise to profligate
and rapacious inclinations while free trade did not. In their eyes, the virtuous merchant
was not to blame as he represented a distinct form of patriotism. The merchant was
equally motivated by the interests of rational capital accumulation and the amassing of
public honors by facilitating the amelioration of his fellow citizens. Men of letters such as
the marquis de Saint-Lambert decried the excesses of luxury which had been amplified in
mid-eighteenth-century France. He exclaimed that the problem was not the mercantile
class, it was an endemic issue rooted in the monarchical institutions of Europe since
Louis XIV. The reign of the Sun King had been characterized by fiscalism, monopolism,
and ballooning of the public debt. The ruler’s administration, and not the commercial
actor, had botched its moral obligation to maintain an equilibrium between prosperity and
virtue.46
The edification of the merchant order exhibited noticeable evolutions from the
late seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century in early modern Europe. According to
historian Daniel Roche, the education of the trader had frequently omitted the subject of
literature and its intricacies. In the French port town of Saint-Malo for example, Roche
notes that it was common “to say that ‘going to school is neither useful nor convenient.’
Instead of being schooled at the collèges, sons of merchants were sent to sea or to a
merchant house in another country…by the middle of the eighteenth century…desire for
social advancement brought more merchant children into elite education.”47 The
aforementioned Le parfait négociant, one of the most prominent merchant guidebooks
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first published in the late seventeenth century, had advocated for a lengthy apprenticeship
and the instillation of certain moral necessities that later paralleled Montesquieu’s doux
commerce. Primarily, however, Savary had stressed formal adherence to the mentor and
understudy paradigm as well as absorption of the practical elements of the commercial
profession. It was not until after the Seven Years’ War in the 1760s and 1770s that
merchants became desirous of magnifying their erudition in order to achieve increased
social mobility. The mercantile order began procuring more monographs and augmenting
their own personal libraries. They also became patrons at lending libraries and, according
to Roche, the class of French traders grew to be at the forefront of current events and the
latest news regarding economic and political vicissitudes.48
As merchants improved their learnedness, they increasingly sought creative
methods to support their business interests while distancing themselves from luxury
commerce and the ruinous headwinds that corruption heralded for the body politic.
Beginning in the 1770s and 1780s, merchants involved in the fashion industry
commenced the utilization of marketing exploits through publicity. This assemblage of
French businessmen sought to shift public opinion of fashion away from its connotations
of luxurious depravity by identifying attire as a mode of expression for women. Shovlin
notes that “fashion merchants and the fashion press sought to separate la mode
from…corruption and luxury by redefining it as a peculiarly feminine concern,
and…as…tasteful self-expression, rather than courtly display. The fashion press also
made the argument that fashion stimulated the national economy.”49 Brokers who were
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able to traverse lithely between the social circles of the mercantile order and the Republic
of Letters were especially influential and played a crucial role in propounding commerce
as beneficial to society in its ability to create both wealth and peace. The socioeconomic
nexus for trade and its advantageous implications for humanity resided in the mutual trait
of sympathy. Among rural citizens, compassion arising from the exchange of modest
agricultural production appeared to instill in them more industry and civility. In a
vindication of commerce published in 1774 by Nicolas Bergasse who was the son of a
renowned merchant house with branches in Lyons and Marseilles, commodity
interdependence caused French agriculturalists to become more refined in their
mannerisms and less barbarous.50
Traders continued to demonstrate their ingenuity in the late eighteenth century
through the utilization of affiches, weekly subscription-based newspapers containing
advertisements, up-to-date commodity prices, and stock quotes.51 These adverts were
circulated with the goal of convincing individuals that commerce was indeed useful for
the economy, rather than injurious to the body politic. Personages such as Bergasse
believed that the result of prolonged excess was the precipitous erosion of civil liberties
and the collapse of civilizations. Luxury, a derivative of monarchical customs and not of
commerce itself, was combated by French merchants through press campaigns. The
affiches became a lively hub for the display of commercial activities, auctions, and
shipping updates in port towns as well as the Parisian metropole. It was in the 1770s and
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1780s that a new form of luxury began to emerge from the inventive minds of
commercial actors and promoters. Publishing supervisors “were anxious to avoid charges
of endorsing luxury. Most editors followed the new Enlightenment position that
distinguished between a vicious luxury associated with ostentation and a luxury of
comfort and convenience characteristic of the virtuous middling ranks.”52 Here a
distinctive and nonthreatening species of luxury was formulated by the merchant order
that the indigent could aspire to achieve without betraying their countrymen. Brokers
orchestrating these publications forewent the construction of profit-oriented narratives in
order to endorse a financial egalitarianism while simultaneously disseminating
Enlightenment ideologies. The novel marketing campaigns organized by traders were
significant not only for their attempt to convince the people of the benefits of both
commerce and attenuated luxury to society, but also for their efforts to transform the
public opinion of merchants as indispensable to their communities.
The mercantile order adhering to the precepts of doux commerce in the eighteenth
century was instrumental in altering societal perception of commerce, the merchant’s role
in business activities, and the ethical nature of capital accumulation itself. Historically,
the merchant figure had been maligned with misrepresentations and caricatures as an
individual of ill repute. The trader’s quest for affluence was viewed as a Machiavellian
pursuit by non-commercial members of society. The merchant’s singularly pecuniary
focus caused them to be construed as dishonorable and the mercantile profession was
viewed as one that would bring ignominy to its practitioners. In order to alter society’s
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perception of their activities, the merchants argued that commerce and rational capital
accumulation was a virtuous calling that could be imitated by other citizens to expand
moral uprightness and foster peace between individuals and nations. Reproducing the
tenets of doux commerce in both merchant associates and in society was a preeminent
method for establishing a more favorable narrative among the people and convincing
individuals that the private interests of business activities could be subservient to the
public good. During the late eighteenth century, the commercial dialectic generated by
the merchant order saw a discernable uptick in the desire to utilize honor to enliven
economic interests and this “disseminated a way of thinking about the merchant as a
being responsive to honor at least as much as to profit. Moreover, merchants were
powerfully attracted to honorific distinctions that still played such an important role in
creating and marking status.”53 For the merchant order, the inoffensive ambition towards
improved social mobility was a primary impetus in their attempt to infuse business
dealings with honor, as evinced by their purchase of lands, offices, and other forms of
property. These markers of station were utilized in part to persuade society that
commerce could be both respectable and mollifying.
One of the keys to replicating the virtuous merchant’s creed of doux commerce in
citizens individually and societies collectively to prove that commercial activity was
constructive for the body politic was the characteristic of emulation. Le négociant
patriote, a monograph first published in 1779 by a merchant named Bedos, was a
formidable effort to cast the merchant as an altruistic and devoted citizen who was
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inspired by honor, munificence, and patriotism rather than purely financial incentives.
The passions of irrational self-interest and unsatiable capital accumulation had corrupted
the mores of mercantilist actors globally and it was the emulation of honor that could
salvage those with influence in commercial industries. The merchant Bedos remarked
that for those “sublime” merchant souls, patriotism “consumes them” and that he
preferred “honor to the loss of my life.”54 Previously in the eighteenth century,
Enlightenment figures such as the chevalier d’Arcq and Mirabeau had posited that honor
should be reserved solely for the nobility of the Second Estate. They claimed that honor
would be squandered by the commercial members of the Third Estate because they were
not sensitive to its subtleties and were incapable of placing the public interest above their
own private interests. However, this argument proved tenuous and without merit. The
emulation of honor and the permeation of harmony between entities in the late eighteenth
century proved to engender both peace and fair dealings among agriculturalists and
commercial actors alike.
As emissaries of doux commerce globally, the mercantile order benefitted from
the Third Estate’s growing discontent with certain members of the Second Estate.
Historically, the nobility had accumulated and monopolized honors while encouraging
communal arrangements predicated upon a system of privileges and reinforced by
plutocratic social structures. For the aristocracy, luxury commerce, cultural decadence,
and profligate spending had all embodied brazen exhibitions of their power. As the
eighteenth century progressed, individuals from every social stratum began to perceive
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that the interests of the monarchy and the courtly elite were not aligned with overarching
national interests. Social resentment and discord between the estates had been mounting
since the seventeenth century, when those with sufficient capital began purchasing venal
offices en masse to gain the prestige of the nobility. These civic posts became luxury
commodities themselves, intensifying wealth disparities between families and
encouraging the ostentatious display of income to distinguish the affluent from the
indigent. While the merchants of doux commerce had purchased lesser offices to gain the
rank and recognition of the Second Estate, it was for purposes of honor, emulation, and
altering societal perception of both commerce and their occupation. The grandiose
pageantry put forth by iniquitous members of the Second Estate ran in contradistinction
to merchants practicing doux commerce in the late eighteenth century. The mercantile
order engaging in economical commerce had developed a tempered form of luxury that
promoted the acquisition of eases and amenities, rather than pretensions. Critics of the
ruling class “attacked the use of pomp for purposes of social distinction arguing not that
magnificence should be the sole prerogative of the king and the nobility, but that
conspicuous consumption should no longer be used to constitute social order or political
authority.”55 While the improvidence of the courtly elite had produced socioeconomic
divide through the exploitation of their sinecures, virtuous merchants observing the
principles of doux commerce redefined luxury that presented newly acquired status in a
tasteful fashion that furthered societal cohesion.
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Whereas the upper echelon of the aristocracy or Les Grands held the plurality of
chief posts within the crown administration of the Ancien Régime, the merchants of doux
commerce focused on elevating their stature in an inoffensive manner to the middling
ranks of the nobility.56 This distinction is significant because it underscores the
psychological differences in the economic mindsets between the courtly elite and the
virtuous merchants employing doux commerce in their commercial endeavors. Luxury
commerce favored by the monarchy and aristocracy ran in contradistinction to
economical commerce, judicious capital accumulation, and mutual enrichment touted by
merchants of doux commerce. Remarking on the commercial prosperity in France during
the 1770s, Alexandre Deleyre who collaborated with Raynal on the Histoire
philosophique et politique des deux Indes commented that “the source of corruption when
a nation grew rich through trade, he suggested, was the ability of the powerful to engross
much of the wealth, giving themselves over to ‘luxury,’ ‘intrigue,’ and a ‘baseness that is
called grandeur.’”57 The exploitation of prestigious venal offices and bureaucratic
positions within the Ancien Régime did not serve the interests of the majority, but rather
the unquenchable thirsts for extravagance of the courtly minority. A nobility whose
actions are not considered genuine public service, and which are disadvantageous to
national interests, bodes as an ill omen for the swift destruction of a society’s commerce,
government, and industry. Contrarily, the mercantile order following the teachings of
doux commerce may thwart the dissolution of the body politic by strengthening trade
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partnerships between individuals and nations. The advent of peace through free trade by
establishing and maintaining mutual business interests between entities was a primary
consequence of the adoption of doux commerce and its propagation by the virtuous
merchants of the late eighteenth century.
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Chapter Three: The Epistolary Correspondence of Transatlantic Merchants
The elucidation of mercantile conduct is a vital prerequisite to understanding how
merchants became agents of change amidst shifting global landscapes. Disseminating the
virtuous principles of doux commerce both domestically and transnationally promoted
developments at local, regional, and national levels, gradually aiding in the dissolution of
mercantilism while advocating for peace and free trade. One of the primary methods by
which merchants accomplished this feat was the practice of letter writing. It was this
communicatory pursuit coupled with an intricate knowledge of current events that
positioned merchants as a driving force for economic advancements within the complex
dynamic of trade networks during the early modern period. Utilizing a series of
merchants and their correspondences as case studies, this chapter will seek to underscore
how mercantile agents participated in a uniquely multidisciplinary profession that,
through doux commerce, assisted in the development of the burgeoning field of political
economy and the evolution of societies at economic, social, and political levels.
Our first case study involves the epistolary correspondence of Robert Plumsted, a
London-based Quaker merchant whose writings are dated between 1752 and 1758. The
first letter book, bequeathed to the University of Cambridge by the university librarian
Henry Bradshaw in 1887, contains letters written from 1756 to 1758. The second
Plumsted letter book, left undiscovered by researchers for many years, includes
correspondences from 1752 to 1756 and was acquired by Yale University in 2002.58
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Robert Plumsted’s grandfather Robert Plumsted Sr. established the family business with
branches in both London and Philadelphia. At his death, he had generated a profitable
export trade to North America and the Caribbean, leaving his successor Thomas
Plumsted with capital and inventory amounting to £7,989 in 1729. Thomas granted his
son Robert Plumsted a partnership with the firm in 1746.59
Robert Plumsted’s family specialized in the cargo trade; a term coined by
historian Richard Pares wherein transatlantic merchants exported manufactured
commodities on credit to colonial clientele. Importers from the American colonies
shouldered the risk of possible cargo loss as well as shipping costs for ordered items,
while consigning merchants levied a commission on outbound shipments and for
managing remittances.60 After the exportation of commodities to the American colonies,
bills of exchange were drawn upon English merchants, with the underlying capital
provided by wholesale suppliers in the London metropole and the outlying provinces.
Letter writing was the binding interlocutory element that conveyed relevant financial
information to respective parties and expediated the complicated nature of
communicatory processes that merchants experienced during the eighteenth century.
Historians S.D. Smith and T.R. Wheeley note that the merchant’s correspondence
“formed the active ingredient in the emerging web of trade because the transmission of
information remained wedded to the sailing routes of vessels. In consequence, while
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innovations in commercial journalism occurred, letter writing remained the most
expeditious and flexible mode of long-distance communication.”61 The letter books of
Robert Plumsted reveal numerous business relationships between himself and partners
such as his cousin William Plumsted located in the key port city of Philadelphia as well
as Robert Wilson, a Jamaican planter in the Caribbean. Intimate knowledge of one’s
honor and moral character were central elements for Plumsted and his contemporaries as
these were some of the gauges of merchant fidelity and the ability to repay one’s debts in
a timely manner. A positive reputation strengthened by the ethical nature of doux
commerce was integral to the formation of credit, an indispensable element in the
exchange of goods and the continuation of merchant activities in the early modern period.
Trustworthiness and credit were often inseparable during the mid-eighteenth
century as evinced by Plumsted’s careful association with certain merchants and
businesspeople whom he could rely on to dutifully manage their financial houses and
debt obligations. Plumsted meticulously apportioned credit in durations of six to nine
months for most goods and his dealings underscored the unrelenting issue of overseeing
one’s affairs in a suitable fashion to handle cash gaps. In order to minimize possible
shortfalls, Plumsted argued that for mercantile undertakings, “Large Busyness Requires
Large Circulation” and “Circulation…is the life of Busyness.”62 The extension of credit
out to twelve months was a topic of contentious debate for Plumsted and fellow Quaker
merchants. Initially, he argued that the proposition would cause “sure but Slow
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Destruction.” Subjective distribution of credit for a lesser period was sometimes
challenged by the need to match the competition and by 1753, he was forced to provide
“merchandise at twelve months’ credit, with commission set at 2.5 per cent and an
interest charge of 5 per cent for late remittances.”64 Mercantile rivalries notwithstanding,
the Plumsted letter books reveal how the network of Quaker traders were concerned with
the dilution of community ethics and the degeneration of their faith into moral turpitude
as a result of increased materialism. Religious discussions reinforced the need to uphold a
principled approach during commercial activities when dealing with both credit and
luxury.
The ethical nature of doux commerce assisted Plumsted in preserving the delicate
balance between profit motives and the conservation of a righteous moral fabric. While
Plumsted sought to preserve business relationships with wealthy partners, he nonetheless
maintained an air of reservation about the growing affinity for extravagant indulgences
among clientele. In the wake of an order for lavish trinkets, he hoped that “the pleasure of
those trifles may be Eclipst By the more Transcendant Beauty of Piety & Vertue.”65
Quaker merchants and non-commercial members of the faith were not precluded from
reaching an affluent stature or from attaining comforts available to their station.
Nevertheless, frequent advocation for asceticism put luxury commerce squarely in
opposition to the goals of a tempered existence that Plumsted and other Quakers had
dedicated themselves. Consequently, economical commerce and prudent capital
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accumulation were more in keeping with the lifestyle that Plumsted and fellow merchants
aspired to lead. However, the onset of the Seven Years’ War and the ensuing global
conflict strained the resolve of Quaker merchants committed to doux commerce and an
ethos of peaceful international trade as the commercial interests entwined with
microeconomic dynamics were destabilized by various political interests tethered to
macroeconomic forces.
The quest for global dominion between the British Empire and France on the
world stage during the Seven Years’ War was problematic for Plumsted and Quaker
merchants that favored a peaceful equilibrium during commercial enterprise. The
diplomatic nature of doux commerce was tested by the armament requirements of both
England and France, and Plumsted struggled with the ethical question of dealing in
firearms. Various correspondences revealed that trading in military equipment such as
“Militia” muskets and bayonet attachments distressed Plumsted on moral grounds based
upon his formal adherence to a code of pacifism. Despite his hesitancy, if buyers insisted
upon the purchase of these items, he supplied them without charging a commission fee to
justify his business decisions.66 The broader reverberations of the Seven Years’ War and
their impact on Quaker merchants came to the fore as growing schisms between the
London and Philadelphia branches of the Plumsted family revealed themselves. At the
outset of the war in June 1756, “six members of Pennsylvania’s Assembly resigned en
masse, a decision marking the effective end of Quakerism’s political ascendancy in the
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colony.” The advent of this political exodus from the Pennsylvanian Assembly arose
from a disagreement between the London and Philadelphia Quakers over whether to
support a militaristic defense in the hinterlands. Although Robert Plumsted sided with the
nonviolent faction in order to maintain both a clear conscience and his religious
principles, the Seven Years’ War exemplified how difficult it was to sustain an equipoise
when disharmony existed between merchants exercising their commercial interests and
bureaucratic officials representing their political interests.
During this moment of sociopolitical upheaval in the mid-eighteenth century,
Plumsted urged both merchants and Quaker contemporaries to realign their moral
compasses, provoking adjustments in business transactions while tightening requirements
for loan qualifications within the colonial credit market. Upon receipt of bankruptcy news
from a known merchant, Plumsted wished that the effects of this information would yield
“a Check to the Unreasonable humour which prevails of Giving Credit to almost any
person who Calls himself a Merchant” and lamented further that “this practice has
Glutted the markets all over America & Ruin’d many an honest man in this Citty.”68 The
completion of business contracts and the collection of debts were arduous tasks that
required both resources and time to execute. The practice of doux commerce afforded
Plumsted and contemporary merchants increased social credibility while providing a
system of conduct that vouchsafed surety of payment during times of uncertainty.
Character dependability offered an additional layer of insulation from the threat of default
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in trade environments where prolonged interludes existed between the shipment, receipt,
and payment for commodities during transatlantic commercial activity. For Plumsted, the
ethos of doux commerce in tandem with the meticulous construction of social capital
structures enabled the formulation of stable business models that allowed merchants to
identify viable loan candidates based upon reputation and reliability.
The Seven Years’ War was not the only phenomenon that presented challenges to
Plumsted via dynamic fluctuations in the economic, social, and political landscapes of the
early modern period. The principles of doux commerce and diplomatic commercial
activity were likewise tested by the controversial practice of the slave trade and its
corresponding business interests. Robert Plumsted’s commercial interests had involved
the exportation of goods to satisfy the demands of the slave economy in the Caribbean.
He dealt in various agricultural produce garnered through slave labor on the Jamaican
plantations as well as commodities integral to the infrastructure of the sugar estates.
Plumsted had assisted in the provision of a “number of Quaker correspondents with tools
and machinery used to cultivate and process sugar cane…James Scott…received water
mill parts…and…wooden staves for his Retreat Estate; he was also supplied with boilers
constructed ‘upon quite a new plan,’ aimed at improving fuel efficiency.”69 While the
ethical nature of Plumsted’s mercantile endeavors had been complicated by the disrepute
of the slave economy, it is posited that the principal intent of doux commerce in
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furthering peace through free trade was not undermined. Plumsted’s letter books reveal a
prudent merchant that sought to improve his socioeconomic position while upholding the
virtues promulgated by members of the Quaker faith. The expansion of transatlantic
trade, coupled with the development of credit markets, had generated the need to be more
discerning in commercial matters. Plumsted sought to promote selectivity in the
allocation of credit and condemned instances where he witnessed a dissolution of the
moral fabric of his merchant contemporaries. Unreliable debtors were chastened with
such comments as substituting “good for evil.”70 His conduct exemplified some of the
key ideological tenets of doux commerce; a fusion of honorable business activity coupled
with the sensible allotment of credit, positively affecting merchant behavior
transnationally that could be emulated at local, regional, and national levels.
Another eighteenth-century trader whose letters embodied the attitudes and
beliefs of doux commerce was British businessman Richard Champion. The original
letters may be found at the Huntington Library in San Marino, California with official
publications by the University of California, Berkeley Press in 1934 and Kraus Reprint
Co. in 1974 respectively. Champion began his career under the tutelage of his uncle, a
prominent Bristol merchant in 1762. After five years, he had accumulated enough capital
to set out on his own and by 1767, he joined the Society of Merchants.71
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Champion gained prominence as a Bristol merchant and porcelain manufacturer
whose epistolary correspondences spanned from 1766 to 1776, a period occupying the
space after the Seven Years’ War and immediately preceding the American
Revolutionary War. Champion’s letters are important because they provide unique
insights into the complex intersectional relationship between the transatlantic commercial
and political realms of the American colonies and the British Empire during the mid-tolate eighteenth century. Champion had been affiliated with the Whig party and was also a
friend of Edmund Burke, eventually supporting his campaign to represent the city of
Bristol as MP in the House of Commons. Champion’s business interests were intimately
connected with both England and the American colonies. Consequently, he was staunchly
in favor of maintaining an advantageous commercial relationship between the two.
During this period of increased tension and uncertainty, he condemned the actions of
George Grenville, a British statesman that ascended to the position of prime minister who
had purportedly dealt severe blows to the commerce of the empire. Champion bemoaned
that the “distressing State in Particular to which he reduced the trade of the America
Provinces cannot be denied…The Connexion…between America and the mother
Country, brought all their Distresses to our own Doors; our Merchants received no
Remittances…and many of our Manufactories were obliged…to be greatly reduced.”72
For Champion, the degradation of commercial reciprocity between the American colonies
and the British Empire was a complicated matter ignited by a multiplicity of factors
emanating from both the realms of business and government.
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The commercial ties between England and the American colonies came under
immense pressure with the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765. The Act levied direct taxes
upon certain printed materials in the colonies, forcing colonists to utilize an embossed
paper accompanied by an imprinted revenue stamp that was manufactured in the London
metropole and required payment in British currency. Champion’s letters present an
intriguing perspective of a British merchant that sympathized with the plight of unjust
taxation in the colonies, noting that “the American Trade was sunk so low, as to be
incapable of bearing additional Taxes. They had already born the loss of their, and our
most [lucrative] Trade, the exchanging the Manufactures of the Country for Bullion with
great murmurs… It was no wonder…that the Stamp Act…produced… disorders.”73
Champion argued that the Grenville ministry was laden with naïve bureaucrats who were
inexperienced in commercial matters and that the heavy-handed duties of the Stamp Act
were counterintuitive to producing salubrious business relationships between them. He
contended that in order to stave off unreserved bedlam and dissent, the law needed to be
rescinded. Champion inferred that the repeal of the Stamp Act might incite disruptions
within Parliament, causing members of the legislative body to lose their offices.
However, he believed that this was a necessary consequence to protect the overall
wellbeing of British national economic interests.
Champion also noted the existence of certain commercial restrictions imposed
upon the American colonies by the British government. These business restraints further
hindered colonists’ ability to accrue capital and develop prosperous enterprise, provoking
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further discontent and unrest. Observing the parliamentary machinations in England,
Champion remarked that “the Ministers will now direct their Views towards the other
Grievances which the Colonies complain of. Their Intention is to remove the intolerable
Restrictions on their Trade, take off the burthensome part of the Admiralty Courts, and
settle every other matter respecting America in a manner, to give her Entire Relief.”74
According to Champion, it was difficult for the ministry to produce meaningful reform
because Parliament remained stymied by partisan politics. The complaints of the
colonists were not unfounded as administrative inefficiencies had facilitated corruption at
the bureaucratic level, producing grievous commercial injustices. Champion surmised
that commercial exploitation of the American colonies had arisen after the Seven Years’
War to increase the power of King George III. However, appearances belied reality in
that the monarchy, under the guise of raising revenues, was truly seeking undue influence
within the nascent American system of government.
Despite acknowledging that England retained the ability to restructure taxation
and trade policies, Champion remained skeptical of desired outcomes because the
dominion over American settlements offered monarchical representatives augmented
influence and power in the form of administrative positions related to colonial activities.
With regards to taxation, he notes that “the very Idea which we Englishmen have, that we
cannot be taxed by any power to which we do not consent, either in our own persons or
our representatives, seems strongly to be raised upon you by…a parliament…whose
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Interest it is to increase your Burthens, that they may lessen their own.” Champion
recognized that the American colonists were without a presence in the British Parliament
and this was problematic for a people that sought evenhanded duties and levies. While
conceding that the American colonists were rightly displeased with unjust legislation, he
reasoned that they should refrain from vitriolic retribution. Champion maintained that in
order to preserve harmonious accords and “to prevent the ill effects of Vice and Villainy
of Men in Power, the People must be resolute, but without Violence in the defence of
their Violated rights; that when they complain of the conduct of their Governor, their own
may be an example.”76 Champion understood the frustration of the colonists, granting
that lawful protestation was warranted, but he emphasized that a peaceful equilibrium
must be upheld in order to safeguard meaningful business interests between commercial
entities.
Expounding on the interplay between commerce and government, Champion
demonstrates astute perception when describing the assemblage of MPs in the English
bureaucracy, the nature of constitutional construction, and the impacts of political
dictums on the possibility of revolution in society. Concerning the political climate in the
British Empire, Champion opines that “we may possibly want a more equal
Representation ourselves, but only for the purpose of preventing the very great corruption
which the great number of boroughs occasion…Revolutions are hazardous, though…we
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owe to the last, these inestimable Privileges which we now possess.” The relationship
between the legislative and executive bodies of a monarchical government and its people
can be quite fragile. If a monarchy neglects its citizens and implements edicts that run
contrary to the interests of those it claims to represent, then these inequitable decrees may
produce commercial instability and revolutionary activity. According to Champion, civic
uprisings are not to be assessed lightly. Societal hostilities in the public sphere imply an
equal amount of both danger and promise. For example, James II was deposed from the
throne in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 following denunciations over monarchical
absolutism and religious intolerance. For Champion, this late seventeenth-century
destabilization had produced beneficial outcomes in solidifying the primacy of
Parliament over the monarchy while bequeathing to British citizens innumerable rights
and privileges. Ultimately, however, the solution to eluding sociopolitical upheavals and
maintaining economic stability was to ensure the election of officials that were impartial
in their judgment and steadfast in upholding the rights of the people.
Champion’s interpretation of the occasionally paradoxical relationship between
the commercial interests of doux commerce and the political interests of English
bureaucrats within the empire is further underscored through the discussion of the
parliamentary debates occurring in the 1770s. As a generality, he noted that the American
colonists did not often dispute specific laws, but rather the extent of their general rights
within the British Empire. Champion mentions that “from the conduct of Administration
in almost every step their Irresolution and incapacity appear for during a great part of the
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Sessions…the American affairs were never brought on the Carpet…the Merchants of
Bristol petitioned for a repeal of all the Acts…but all in vain.”78 Bristol merchants,
including Champion, had advocated for the repeal of certain legislation that adversely
impacted their business partners in the American colonies and heralded dissonance
between mutual business interests. Despite these impediments, he reasoned that the
Americans could suffer the manufactured paucity of imports from England if they
endeavored to increase their own industrial production domestically. However, one of the
most insidious evils that a developing society can tolerate during this exertion is the
pervasion of luxury commerce as it can single-handedly constrain efforts towards
independence.
While Champion declared that the Americans were laudable in disavowing
perceived injustices from the British Empire, he argued that the colonists ought not be
capricious as their actions might detract from the overall health of commercial reciprocity
and administrative equilibrium. For merchants, the quality of trust and debt fulfillment
are integral elements to upholding business compacts. Champion lamented that the
Americans had repudiated their debts, “a Practice which is…destructive to Commerce
and destroys that faith without which it cannot Subsist…tho’ Interest may plead strongly
with those Concerned in the American Trade…if an artful government should hereafter
attempt their Liberties they may find themselves without resource.”79 Champion felt that
the American colonists were defensibly indignant regarding their feelings of unjust
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taxation and inequitable trade practices. However, he believed that by neglecting
remittances and refusing British goods, the Americans were being cavalier and
impetuous. The conduct of the colonists sat poorly with their transatlantic allies that
preferred doux commerce and diplomatic commercial accords. The actions of the
Americans were an affront to British merchant sentiment as they experienced similar
taxes levied upon their mercantile proceedings and the refusal of English commodities by
the colonists inhibited their ability to carry on prosperously.
The status of transatlantic imports and exports was a source of constant anxiety
for Champion during the 1770s. His correspondence with Messrs. Thomas Willing and
Robert Morris of Philadelphia reveals an internal conflict between his political support of
the American cause and the perpetuation of business interests with the colonies. He wrote
apprehensively that “we impatiently expect News from America…A Non-Importation
will I suppose take place…a non-Exportation should be the last Resource…like a violent
Medicine administered in the last stage of a fever, the Chance of Life or Death is
equal.”80 While Champion applauded the Americans’ staunch advocacy of fair treatment
in the exchange of commodities with the British Empire, he beseeched colonial
merchants to renounce the sequestration of goods from their English counterparts. He
conceded that the implementation of certain prejudicial taxes and laws by previous
ministers such as the late Mr. Grenville had been tyrannical and unjust. Mr. Grenville had
abused the trade partnership between the two, a connection that enhanced wealth
provision in England and introduced greater quantities of specie to the colonies. This
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unfair treatment notwithstanding, Champion maintained that doux commerce and a
concord between the colonies and the mother country should prevail.
Champion’s epistolary correspondences are unique and significant because they
provide a vibrant context to the commercial and political relationship between the British
Empire and the American colonies during the period immediately preceding the
American Revolutionary War. As a practitioner of doux commerce, the Bristol merchant
yearned for amity between the mother country and her colonies while supporting the
American sentiment that certain tax and trade policies were unfavorable for colonial
business interests. This peculiar attitude caused Champion to be maligned at various
intervals by his peers. Remarking on his castigation by numerous colleagues, he mentions
that “as for us poor Traders who have dared to express our Sentiments in favour of the
Colonies, we have the Comfort not only of being called factious, but also of being called
fools for our Interference with a Business, which did not belong to us, for that the
Business of a Merchant is his Interest only.”81 The English administrative and
bureaucratic elite believed that mercantile professionals should be concerned solely with
their individual commercial interests and refrain from meddling in the affairs of
statecraft. However, Champion remained captivated by political maneuverings as a friend
and ally of Edmund Burke and as someone wholly engrossed by the machinations of the
British Parliament. The governmental intrigue within his letters underscored the oft
inseparable nature of the commercial and political realms and emphasized the fragility of
doux commerce. The steadfast dedication to peace through free trade and the
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strengthening of ties between entities could be upended by monarchical or parliamentary
interests, displacing commercial interests for alleged political gain.
A third case study illuminating the multifaceted nature of the mercantile
occupation and the dissemination of doux commerce by merchant professionals across
economic, social, and political domains during the early modern period is the letter books
of Joshua Johnson. The epistolary correspondences, dated between 1771 and 1774,
inform the reader less about the influences of religion and politics on trade than the letters
of Robert Plumsted and Richard Champion, but they are equally informative and
enlightening regarding the proliferation of peace through free trade during the early
modern period. The letters are physically preserved in the Maryland State Archives and
are available remotely through British History Online. Johnson’s communications
embody the resolve of a merchant that evaded financial insolvency to become the seventh
largest tobacco importer in London during the mid-1770s.82
Writing in the late eighteenth century, Johnson’s letters are tinged with
didacticism and highlight the socioeconomic vicissitudes that traders experienced
throughout the reign of mercantilism as the predominant economic modality of the
Occident. Johnson was a merchant from Maryland, whose partners Charles Wallace and
John Davidson merged their independent businesses to create the firm Wallace, Davidson
& Johnson in early 1771. Wallace and Davidson remained in Maryland to oversee their
end of the business in the American colonies while Johnson traveled across the Atlantic
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to England in order to set up the London branch of their firm. The letters underscore a
decidedly fastidious merchant whose steadfast dedication to the success and survival of
their interests was nearly unmatched. Johnson’s correspondences indicate the vast array
of knowledge in a multitude of arenas that an efficacious merchant needed to possess as
well as the requisite characteristic of alacrity which was of paramount importance to
carry on mercantile affairs.
Johnson was frequently occupied with the minutiae that accompanied being a
partner in a merchant firm. Regarding the price of commodities and credit in 1771, he
wrote to his associates that “there is many things I was obliged to pay ready money
for…particularly the sugar from [James] Piercy; the allowance was considered in the
price and quality…being the most capital [sugar baking] house in London, though it is
not like any other business, for their credit is but 2 months to anybody.”83 In order for
Johnson’s mercantile endeavors to prosper, he needed a broad network of contacts and
mutual business interests. It was also compulsory that he possess a familiarity with an
assortment of merchandise and up-to-date information on commercial dynamics, political
activities, and the price of goods. Intermittently, he handled the difficulties associated
with certain merchant houses because their credit allotments were atypical or
unfavorable. Nevertheless, it was imperative for the endurance of his firm that he procure
merchandise of the highest quality while nurturing peaceful and equitable trade relations
with reliable commercial allies.
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Johnson labored through diverse hardships in the late eighteenth century as credit
scarcity and excessive price speculation with commodities such as tobacco and wheat
precipitated the bankruptcy and downfall of numerous merchant houses involved in
transatlantic commercial activity. His business proceedings during the early 1770s proved
to be some of the most difficult as the protestation of bills of exchange created a plethora
of litigious and logistical issues. Regarding certain promissory notes drawn upon London
houses, Johnson mentions that he would “forward them under protest if they are not
paid.” As far as his financial straits, he noted that “my finances are exceedingly small to
support me and the credit of my company…there was a field opened for our making
£1,500 or £2,000 on tobacco this year had we accepted of the consignment business and
pushed it; a number was surprised we did not and a number was afraid we should.”84
During the early modern period, merchants dealt with the constant fluctuation of a
multitude of variables such as climate, credit, freight, harvests, and nautical voyages.
Sizeable profits could be made through the cargo trade and other avenues of exchange if
all organizational elements aligned properly. However, speculation occasionally
produced desolation because of cargo disappearance, credit restriction, crop loss,
inclement weather, and late shipments. Johnson witnessed the disastrous consequences of
rampant speculation among his peers and labored tirelessly to withstand the adverse
effects of its diffusion.
A successful commercial agent not only required the knowledge of commodities
and trade networks, but also a knowledge of the commanders of merchant vessels and the
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most efficacious means of transporting correspondence. In a letter to his firm, Johnson
observed that “we have a large 3 deck ship called the Annapolis commanded by Thomas
Eden put up for your port. I am told that [Christopher] Court is the merchant and part
concerned…I will write you again in a few days and have only to say that I hope your
next will bring me the pleasing account of the receipt of the goods.”85 Johnson was
unequivocally devoted to merchant undertakings and the survival of his firm. By
cultivating acquaintanceships with captains and strengthening his familiarity with
individuals in the supply chain, he increased the likelihood of successful delivery of both
letters and goods. Additionally, while in London, he quickly ascertained the most
expeditious method of sending correspondence which was through the New York packet
at Falmouth. Although more expensive than standard carriage, punctuality was itself an
indispensable commodity. Promptness of communication was a significant determinant in
the conveyance of recent commodity prices and information regarding harvest yields and
crop quality. Maintaining reliability within the circuitous nature of the transatlantic
commercial ecosystem aided in preserving the solvency of his firm and ensured the
continuance of its favorable credit allotment and reputation among trade partners.
Occasionally, Johnson chastised his partners Wallace and Davidson because of their
frugal tendencies. He believed that commercial information and quality of wares were
some of the more essential components with which they could not afford to be
parsimonious.
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In addition to the comprehensive knowledge of and an ethical commitment to the
fulfillment of commercial interworkings, Johnson also promulgated the virtuous
principles of doux commerce by catering to societal trends and being attuned with the
sentiment of buyers. Regarding a shipment of porcelain transported by the East India
Company, Johnson remarked that “I waited till after the [East India Company’s] sale
under expectations that it would be cheaper and a greater variety, but was most unluckily
disappointed, there being no other patterns than those sent in 16 ships’ cargoes and all
kinds except plates and dishes being very dear.”86 Merchant actors such as Johnson aided
in forging agreeable connections between different groups by shepherding a distinctly
transnational consumer culture. By creating needs for global commodities among
domestic buyers at home in the American colonies and in the London metropole, Johnson
was encouraging a mutual commercial reciprocity between societies and a shared desire
for the material representations of their respective civilizations. An affinity for goods
imported from overseas improved endogenous opinions of exogenous peoples, reducing
the possibility of malicious actions against trade partners and strengthening the
interconnectivity between individuals of diverse backgrounds. The commercial interests
of doux commerce augmented sentiments of cultural sophistication and cosmopolitan
internationality while solidifying tranquil objectives between numerous societies
worldwide.
As with the epistolary correspondence of Richard Champion, the letter books of
Joshua Johnson contain materials that illuminate the complex intersectional relationship
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between the commercial and political spheres of the British Empire and the American
colonies. Certain letters to the firm Wallace, Davidson & Johnson reveal that the
economic modality of mercantilism was often a hindrance to doux commerce and the
successful execution of mercantile endeavors. Observing the nature of embargoes and
restrictions on shipments to England, Johnson notes that “a motion has been made in the
House of Commons…to allow the importation of American wheat and flour… the high
price of provisions in general begins to be an alarming circumstance in the nation, but our
wise ministers are…busy in supporting governmental power.”87 Forcing English
merchants to import goods solely from holdings within the empire artificially raised the
price of commodities, leading to steeper expenses for British subjects. The parliamentary
debate cited by Johnson highlights glaring administrative inefficiencies related to
commercial activity as well as import and export tariffs. Precluding the introduction of
certain American produce to London markets diminished the buying power of domestic
consumers through inflated prices, amplifying discontent among the population.
Johnson’s commentary regarding the vociferous cries of the impecunious English
countrymen exemplified the dissonance between the regulatory intentions of central
political interests within the British bureaucracy and the commercial interests of
merchants such as Johnson involved in doux commerce.
The merchant ethos of doux commerce was equally important to the overall
socioeconomic health of societies in the early modern period because it provided a
template to mitigate the foolhardy decisions of traders involved in the irresponsible
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prognostication of future commodity values. The British Credit Crisis of 1772 proved to
be an immense challenge for Johnson and many of those involved in the mercantile
endeavors of the late eighteenth century. The aftereffects of misguided forecasting were
extensive and severe. Amidst the financial turmoil, Johnson communicates that the
“discontent…and uneasiness painted on each brow for days past is not to be expressed,
though, amongst all the misfortunes, I am happy that I can tell you that the Bank of
England came to a resolution of supporting the Ayr Bank and that will go on again. From
this act of lenity, it’s hoped they will not persevere in the ruin of the whole nation.”88
Commercial actors began protesting bills of exchange and promissory notes during this
time, disrupting credit markets, and acting as a catalyst for the financial collapse of a
multitude of banks and merchant houses. Johnson and his partners survived the
calamitous deluge of business foreclosures by operating with a shrewdness of character
and sound judgement in mercantile dealings. At the suggestion of Johnson, the firm was
able to pivot their involvement in part to the tobacco trade and withstand the many cases
of insolvency stemming from the credit crisis.
Rather than owning quantities of individual commodities which could be ruined
during transatlantic voyages, Johnson showed ingenuity by advising his partners to
venture into the consignment business. Discussing the possibility of consigning tobacco
with his partners, Johnson exclaims that “I have repeatedly hinted to you that I thought
we might do something clever in that way [the tobacco consignment trade] provided you
would enter into it with spirit and activity and not agree by any means to ship cargoes [of
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European goods on credit]. The present distressed times…will warrant us success.”

Economic instability and unreliability of paper notes in the wake of the credit crisis had
caused Johnson to seek alternative means for sustaining the financial wellbeing of his
firm. His nimble maneuverings assisted in staving off bankruptcy and ensuring the
survival of their business. The letter books of Joshua Johnson reveal a discerning
merchant well-educated in a multiplicity of fields related to commercial activity. The
correspondences contribute to the historical dialectic by further accentuating the delicate
nature of doux commerce amidst a vast and intricate transatlantic commercial ecosystem.
The advocation of peace through free trade and the cultivation of a positive reputation for
credit purposes could be upended at any juncture by a multitude of factors, some of
which were uncontrollable. Johnson’s merchant letters both highlight and reinforce the
tenuous equilibrium shared between commercial and political interests of societies
involved in transatlantic commercial activity during the late eighteenth century.
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Chapter Four: Peace Through Free Trade and the Rise of Industrial Capitalism
Whereas commercial actors have historically been maligned as solely concerned
with their individual financial interests, it is posited that the agents of doux commerce at
economic, social, and political levels differed in that they heralded the dissolution of
mercantilism while also acting as harbingers of industrial capitalism and free trade.
Although those involved in transatlantic commercial activity busied themselves with the
survival of their respective enterprises, the true malefactors in the hindrance of
international economic development were those who sought to protect their own
monopolistic advantages within mercantilist commercial ecosystems. Utilizing several
historical figures with meaningful contributions to the scholarship of laissez-faire trade
theory and political economy, this chapter will endeavor to explicate how proponents of
doux commerce were catalysts to the formation of peace through free trade on the world
stage. It is hoped that a discernible intellectual thread will emerge, tying Montesquieu’s
theory of doux commerce to the notions of commercial republicanism that emerged in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations is of vital importance to understanding the
economic modality of mercantilism, the employment of both capital and labor, and the
origin of certain biases towards merchants and manufacturers who were “always
demanding a monopoly against their countrymen.”90 Smith, a principal architect of free
market thought and political economy, first published his magnum opus in 1776. Within
the monograph, he discusses a range of subjects and attempts to elucidate the nature of
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mercantilist appetites that prevailed among occidental individuals and governments in the
early modern period. Mercantilism is an inherently protectionist economic system that
bestows favor upon certain administrative, bureaucratic, and commercial elites by
engaging in the practice of monopolism. Embargoes are not infrequent and if
commodities are to be imported from a foreign nation, heavy duties are exacted to ensure
favorable conditions for those controlling the domestic market. The hindrance of free
trade and the imposition of adverse levies can foment war as noted by Smith in the case
of the French Colbert administration against Dutch imports. He mentions that “the war of
1672 seems to have been in part occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of
Nimeguen put an end to it in 1678 by moderating some of those duties in favour of the
Dutch, who in consequence took off their prohibition.”91 Mercantilism can incite
disruptions within the supply chain and create inequities in the balance of trade. These
commercial disparities benefitted a select group of elites who lauded preferential policies
because the laws supported their dominion over domestic production, consumption, and
exchange.
The onset of general privation in a nation is predated by the machinations of those
at the upper echelons of society pursuing the security of their financial undertakings.
Smith opines that “the whole public revenue, is in most countries employed in
maintaining unproductive hands…who in time of peace produce nothing, and in time of
war acquire nothing which can compensate the expense of maintaining them.”92
Corrupted governmental systems and prejudicial economic modalities invariably produce
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ruling classes across a multiplicity of industries with overlapping interests. These
socioeconomic factions are dependent upon the productive output of the working class
while utilizing inter-relational hierarchies to maintain their sinecures. In monarchical
governments for example, the nobility may concern itself with parliamentary intrigue to
promote beneficial decrees for their business dealings. Additionally, their relationship
with commercial and industrial actors in a mercantilist economy is of paramount
importance. Those with influence at the height of administration and bureaucracy
collaborate in tandem with merchants and manufacturers to lobby for unified control of
the domestic market.
Evidence of symbiotic associations between the aristocracy and protectionist
commercial interests in a monopolistic economy are made manifest during instances of
conflict and war. Remarking on the industrial manufacturing during the Seven Years’
War, Smith indicates that “the manufacturers, during the war, will have a double demand
upon them…in the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of
manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on
the return to peace.”93 Administrative and bureaucratic elites in positions of power retain
extensive correspondence networks within the commercial and industrial sectors in order
to secure private interests at the expense of the public good. Practitioners of doux
commerce at economic, social, and political levels differ in their preference of free trade,
which in turn disseminates concord among both individuals and governments
transnationally. The dissolution of monopolies and the propagation of more laissez-faire
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economic policies “promotes peace by removing an important foundation of domestic
privilege…that enhances the domestic power of societal groups likely to support war,
reduces the capacity of free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign policy, and
creates a mechanism by which the state can build supportive coalitions for war.”94 Free
trade undermines the position of internal legislators and producers advocating for
mercantilist exclusivities and embargoes on foreign imports related to commodities
involved in sectors such as the military industrial complex by weakening their vice grip
on domestic commerce and providing consumers with increased access to international
markets.
While the exponents of doux commerce engage in virtuous commercial activity
wherever their capital may be most optimally employed, for Smith, mercantilist
beneficiaries obstruct both national and international commercial development through
the application of exorbitant import tariffs on foreign commodities or outright prohibition
of certain extraneous merchandise. Not only are mercantilist arrangements motivated by
indecorous notions of protectionism and irrational self-interest, but also by unfounded
suppositions of alleged external vulnerabilities they perceive may be exploitable by
neighboring countries. With regards to international prosperity, Smith muses that the
“wealth of a neighbouring nation, however, though dangerous in war and politics, is
certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility it may enable our enemies to
maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in a state of peace and commerce it

94

Patrick J. McDonald, “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 48, no. 4 (2004): 549.

74
95

must likewise enable them to exchange with us to a greater value.” Although
protectionists contend that adjacent countries with flourishing economies may pose
threats to national boundaries, this opinion is reflective of monopolist worldviews to
secure dominion over domestic markets. Agents of doux commerce encouraging free
trade believe that embargoes, prohibitions, and sanctions are generally deleterious to
commercial associations and harmful to the citizenry. The enactment of burdensome
import tariffs on foreign nations directly increases commodity prices on domestic
consumers, constricting purchasing power and limiting their ability to employ capital
effectively. Additionally, these inordinate duties and levies strain international relations
and may provoke militaristic reprisals. Free trade unfetters the market by strengthening
commercial networks and improving harmonious accord between societies.
According to Smith, mercantilism necessarily creates imbalances within
international political economy, limiting wealth creation for the uninitiated and
generating discontent amongst the populous. In essence, the legislative consequences not
only restrict what commodities are to be imported and at what rate, they implicitly dictate
individual choice regarding capital allocation. Smith cautions that “to give the monopoly
of the home market to the produce of domestic industry, in any particular art or
manufacture, is in some measure to direct private people in what manner they ought to
employ their capitals, and must, in almost all cases be…a hurtful regulation.”96
Mercantilism limits the efficacity of industries based upon proximity to authority and
their ability to lobby successfully for advantageous legislation. Agency is removed from
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the apolitical and reapportioned to those whose interests are in maintaining entrenched
power structures. These phenomena run in contradistinction to the ambassadors of doux
commerce whose primary objective is economical and honorable capital accumulation,
the consequences of which are increased pacifism among entities and the preclusion of
warlike struggles.
The antithetical behavior of those espousing doux commerce during the
omnipresence of mercantilism is significant because it directly contributed to the
historical dialectic concerning the relationship between harmonic international relations
and free trade. Modern academicians denote the existence of four distinct variations in
the debate that commerce encourages peace. These are the opportunity cost or deterrence
model, the efficiency argument, the sociological hypothesis, and the bargaining model.97
Nations engaging in commercial reciprocity with one another are less likely to entertain
notions of violent encounters because of the sizeable detriments that may be incurred to
their exchange networks. As commerce between societies increases, conflict and
conquest are deemed inefficient because invasion, occupation, and subjugation become
more expensive. The expansion of free trade globally augments interactions between
citizens of different societies. By creating the possibility for a more transnational
cosmopolitan persona among individuals, nationalist proclivities become destabilized and
inauspicious bureaucratic associations fostering bellicose retaliations subside.
Additionally, commerce itself may furnish a universal apparatus that serves as a
mechanism to participate in bargaining or negotiation that averts martial confrontation. It
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is suggested that the decentralized collective propounding doux commerce aided in
furthering each of these unique circumstances whereby free trade assisted in the
dissolution of mercantilism and the propagation of pacific international relations and
industrial capitalism.
The consequences of widespread adoption and implementation of mercantilism
during the early modern period created unnatural and improvident commercial realities.
Smith mentions “commerce…has become the most fertile source of discord and
animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during the present and
the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe than the impertinent
jealousy of merchants and manufacturers.”98 The courtly, manufacturing, and mercantile
elite become predisposed to protectionist systems because these economies permit
vertical dominion over industry, the pervasion of luxury commerce, and the appointment
of individuals who will defend monopolistic policies that forego public beneficence to
safeguard the exclusive regulatory privileges of a few. These machinations encourage the
cultivation and development of monarchical partisanship. Certain academicians and
scholars believe that democracies are most hospitable to the intricacies of commercial
republicanism and free trade because they provide a medium whereby industrial actors
may lobby on behalf of congruous foreign policies and bequeath agency to domestic
enterprise that would otherwise be adversely impacted by sabotages to their respective
business interests.99 These sentiments coincide with Montesquieu’s perspective that
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republics are more welcoming to doux commerce and the economical accumulation of
capital.
The agents of doux commerce advocating for free trade discover that their
endeavors are more effective in republics because the likelihood for increased exchange
is improved. David Ricardo’s concept of comparative advantage, discussed in the
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, and first published in 1817, demonstrates
that nations may derive commercial windfalls from international trade through increased
specialization with regards to the production of wares. International agricultural demand
generally remains uniform relative to the demand for manufactured goods. Merchandise,
however, is beholden to individual whims and caprices rather than necessity. Regarding
the implementation of additional taxes on industrial commodities, Ricardo indicates that
“a new tax, too, may destroy the comparative advantage which a country before
possessed in the manufacture of a particular commodity…that it can no longer enter into
competition with the home manufacture of the country to which it was before
exported.”100 Adverse tariffs on foreign imports or immoderate duties and levies may
stifle innovation and curtail individual employment of capital to specific industries.
Furthermore, war is disadvantageous to the predominance of the populous who neither
benefit from, nor support its execution.
The accretion of monetary benefit for individuals in a republican system of
government is compounded when the summation of consumption possibilities becomes
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amplified. As Ricardo delineates, the economic traditions of free trade are most
advantageous to prosperity because “under a system of perfectly free commerce, each
country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments as are most
beneficial to each….By stimulating industry…it distributes labour most effectively and
most economically.”101 Deregulation and the global integration of national economies
increases productive output across a variety of industries and manifests the opportunity
for economic affluence among citizens. Universal advantage, honor, and peace are
diffused throughout civilizations by improving access to international markets,
broadening consumer choice and liberating capital for future ventures. Opponents of
international channels to free trade lobby extensively to prevent their economic and
political interests from being undermined. These may include coalitions adversely
impacted by a delegitimization of national monopolies and bureaucracies seeking to
forego domestic policy reform. Government may also deem free trade and peace
impractical as foreign conflict, or threats thereof, may be utilized to inhibit civil liberties
and expand its role in society.102
Ricardo further argued that individuals embracing the ideas of doux commerce
experience a greater deal of profits and commercial stability when oppressive tariffs and
trade restrictions are lifted and their ethos coinciding most proximately with free market
capitalism is realized. When a society rescinds overbearing duties and levies and begins
promoting the principles of free trade, these actions necessarily entail a rebalancing of
power away from monopolist and protectionist interests and towards those propounding
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competition and admittance to international markets. The removal of onerous commercial
limitations challenges organizations most responsible for foreign conflict advocacy and
their propensity to shift the responsibilities of public finance onto decentralized members
of society at the extremities of domestic power structures. Ricardo explains that the
“commencement of war after a long peace, or of peace after a long war, generally
produces considerable distress in trade…it is often protracted, too, by the restrictions and
prohibitions to which the absurd jealousies which prevail between the different states of
the commercial commonwealth give rise.”103 Mercantilist economic systems are
intrinsically prejudicial, benefitting a microcosm of the polity based upon
macroeconomic predilections. Conflict restrains individual liberties through emergency
declarations and the abandoning of national policy restructuring. It also harnesses
domestic production and manufacturing primarily towards wartime efforts. While this
may be profitable to the administrative, bureaucratic, and commercial elites involved in
these industrial exertions, it generates innate disparities with regards to the employment
of capital and the enrichment of a plurality of citizens. A government engages in these
commercial and political realities during transnational military encounters in order to
expand its international footprint, eradicate real or perceived threats to its security
interests, and transfer revenue to political supporters who will reinforce its domestic
position.104
The proponents of doux commerce observing the principles of free trade are more
liable to success in a republican system of government because the potential for
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economical commerce, virtuous business arrangements, and sensible capital
accumulation may be realized. A republic extends the opportunity for upticks in capital
allocation, distributing monetary benefit among a preponderance of the citizenry either
directly through the engagement in profitable commercial enterprise or indirectly through
the purchase of commodities at fair market value. These truths provide circumstances
whereby garnered or unexpended capital may be apportioned to further productive
endeavors. However, administrations endorsing a mercantilist economic order harbor
inherent biases in favor of inorganic trade experiences. Commodities may be subject to
artificial scarcity through reduced productive capacities and the total exclusion of foreign
merchandise to domestic consumers. The uneven division of labor in a mercantilist
country during instances of international confrontation may distort the overall health of
its national economy. During conflict, large portions of the work force are rendered
stationary or underutilized, creating indeterminacies with regards to entire sectors of
industry. Although these challenges to human capital are irregular, Ricardo contends that
it does not leave a society without hope. He states that “when, however, such distress
immediately accompanies a change from war to peace…the funds for the maintenance of
labour have rather been diverted from their usual channel than materially impaired, and
that, after temporary suffering, the nation will again advance in prosperity.”105 While a
society may recover from imbalances in manufacturing during sociopolitical upheavals,
this is not always the case. Of principal importance then, in addition to the ability of men
to continuously deploy both labor and capital effectively, is their capacity to check and
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restrain their government from overreach and lobby successfully for egalitarian political
causes.
As the representatives of doux commerce expand their political influence in
concert with the development of commercial activities, the broadening of comprehensive
trade flows should lend towards the advancement of harmony between individuals,
businesses, and nations. The cultivation of exchange networks through doux commerce at
economic, social, and political levels disincentivizes adversarial encounters and
disagreements in favor of increased transactional security and commercial equilibrium.
The asymmetrical distribution of capital between entities resultant from commercial
ecosystems fostered by mercantilist advocates seeking to maintain untenable economic
orders is upheld, in part, by their connections to those in government possessing
legislative authority and administrative influence. For instance, as the magnitude of
“protected sectors increases, the domestic political influence of these groups on the state
and the potential for military conflict should also increase. Conversely, smaller levels of
protection indicate that free trade lobbies likely to oppose military aggression possess
relatively more domestic political influence.”106 In addition to the economic interests of
protectionist and monopolist factions which are furthered through collaborations with
political allies seeking to preserve the mercantilist status quo, the governing body of a
society as an administrative apparatus retains the capacity to affect both war and peace
through regulatory measures. Because “the state possesses a monopoly on coercion and
the consequent ability to define the basic structure of property rights, and in particular
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monopoly rights, it can restrict entry into domestic markets and regulate the terms of
exchange between buyers and sellers.”107 There exists then, a complex intersectional
hierarchy between economic, social, and political interests with regards to commercial,
domestic, and international relations. The efforts of those supporting the tenets of doux
commerce may be directly advanced or challenged based upon their ability to lobby
successfully for their causes and their proximity to those with the ability to affect change
to existing sociopolitical power structures.
Individuals fearing the erosion of their socioeconomic positions and political
authority directly contributed to the limitation of economic progression in societies such
as Great Britain in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Disciples of mercantilism
believed that inflated tariff rates on imported commodities were justified because they
provided importance sources of revenue for the empire while coinciding favorably with
the landed interests of property owners. While these commercial policies may have been
profitable for a minority of British citizens, the reality yielded increased consumer prices,
elevated national debt, and general privation for the majority. As a result of the
protectionist and monopolist cohort assigning unreasonable taxes on merchandise to
generate income for its devotees and government functions, domestic labor markets and
prospects of reasonable capital accumulation for its citizens were inadvertently
weakened. Contrarily, doux commerce, in tandem with laissez-faire trade theory, allows
consumers and producers to ascertain the most suitable prices for both agricultural and
industrial commodities without interference from antagonistic external forces. Quoting
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Smith, Ricardo explains that “if importation…was at all times free, our farmers…would
probably…get less money for their corn than they do at present when importation is at
most times in effect prohibited; but the money which they got would be of more value,
would buy more goods of all other kinds, and would employ more labour.”108 Although
the quantity of specie garnered by farmers might be less in a noninterventionist trading
environment, their money would be of equal or greater value than if goods had been
inordinately taxed or unfairly excluded from the market. In effect, there would exist a
reduction on the delimitation of the husbandman’s capital and labor and on the national
economy overall.
The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century dialectic encompassing the intellectual
debates between universal free trade advocacy and the protection of national economic
interests through certain import tariffs cannot be fully illuminated without delineating the
work of Friedrich List and his opus The National System of Political Economy, first
published in 1841. The German American economist exemplified the nationalist school
of political economy, calling for the free importation of agricultural produce and raw
materials while maintaining the need for reasonable protections on domestic
manufactured goods via custom duties on foreign commodities.109 One of List’s more
notable contributions is distinguishing between the school of laissez-faire trade theory
that embodied “cosmopolitical” economic thought processes and what he believed to be
true political economy which entailed a dedication to national trade policies. Historically,
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List traces the origins of the cosmopolitical school to French economist François
Quesnay and the Physiocrats. The crucial differences between the teachings of the
cosmopolitical school and the national school are viewing the ways in which the totality
of mankind may attain prosperity versus delimiting inquiries of affluence to “how a given
nation can obtain (under the existing conditions of the world) prosperity, civilization, and
power, by means of agriculture, industry, and commerce.”110
For the more industrialized nations, List contends that there exists an interminable
desire to bestow the means of production upon those countries which are less civilized or
underdeveloped. He argues that Smith and other members of the laissez-faire school have
“omitted to take into consideration the nature of nationalities and their special interests
and conditions, and to bring these into accord with the idea of universal union and an
everlasting peace.”111 According to List, one of the most glaring assumptions of those
espousing universal free trade includes presenting a state of existence that has not yet to
come to pass. This supposition becomes precarious as it may yield the universal
subjection of unindustrialized societies by the principal manufacturing nations, rather
than a universal republic as hypothesized by the abbé de St. Pierre in the early eighteenth
century. The global unification of various communities and national interests can
materialize only by the majority obtaining a similar degree of civilization, industrial
development, political maturity, and diplomatic influence.112 For the German American
economist, the realization of this universal republic and free trade among societies
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internationally, is most optimally formulated with the gradual installation of
infrastructure across the globe. The protections formed in List’s mercantilist commercial
ecosystem shelters the immature economies from exploitation until they can firmly
establish the means of production for themselves.
According to List, national political economy recognizes and comprehends the
prevailing interests and conditions of each nation individually. Contrarily, cosmopolitical
economy grafts ideologies and expectations over international markets that do not
possess comparable levels of manufacturing capabilities as the occidental productive
powers. On universal republics, he remarks that if “a confederation of all nations existed
in reality…the excess population, talents, skilled abilities, and material capital would
flow over from England to the Continental states, in a similar manner to that in which it
travels from the eastern states of the American Union to the western.”113 The historical
realities of material economic development are such that populations across the
continents have developed at varying rates since industrialization efforts began. This has
been due to diverse reasons such as geographical and topological phenomena, access to
raw materials, quantities of arable land, trade opportunities, and pace of technological
innovation and development. The universal free trade advocated by the cosmopolitical
school presupposes that the system will be employed successfully across every society
worldwide. For List, true political science and global communal experience regards the
outcomes of the cosmopolitical species of free trade as irregular. For a true free trade to
arise naturally, the nascent manufacturing nations must first “be raised by artificial
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measures to that stage of cultivation to which the English nation has been artificially
elevated.”114
List asserts that the reasoning for mercantilist protections on certain natively
produced wares is twofold. The exclusion of foreign manufactured commodities from the
home markets creates a surplus of workers with varying skillsets and logically induces
these individuals to employ their capital and labor abroad. Consequently, industrial
sectors fortified by domestic protections would be further strengthened by immigration of
dexterous personnel who could apply their talents to increase a nation’s productive
output. The German American economist contends that the cosmopolitical school errs in
its overt concern with the valuation of goods for purposes of exchange and wealth
accumulation. He states that “the power of producing wealth is therefore infinitely more
important than wealth itself; it insures not only the possession and the increase of what
has been gained, but also the replacement of what has been lost.”115 Not only must a
society busy itself with the price of goods with regards to consumers and producers, but it
must also ensure that the means of production are defended and invigorated. For the
nationalist school, this policy would more appropriately uphold the provision of wealth
for its citizens.
List identifies what he deems to be several deficiencies in the arguments of the
cosmopolitical school. Namely, the proposals suffer from a “boundless cosmopolitanism,
which neither recognizes the principles of nationality, nor takes into consideration the
satisfaction of its interests; secondly, from a dead materialism…thirdly, from a
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disorganizing particularism and individualism.”
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He declares that Smith and those of

similar disposition have disregarded present and future interests of a nation’s productive
powers as well as the political climate of the modern world order. When irrational selfinterest arrogates precedence over the social dynamics of the labor market and the
estimable causes of nations, it disrupts private industry and misrepresents the reality of
civilizations globally and their current state of association with one another. All nations
remain in a constant state of flux along their evolutionary timelines and in varying levels
of agreement. Certain nations are barbarous, some pastoral, others agricultural, and others
still are industrial. While List’s arguments are intermittently persuasive and possess
merit, they remain specious. The implementation of national protections on domestic
manufactures through foreign import tariffs materially undermines collective national
interests in support of bureaucratic protectionism and industrial monopolies. Duties and
levies may become weaponized, embittering trade partners and harming the liquidity of
domestic consumers through higher commodity prices. Therefore, mercantilist
isolationism hinders the economic progression of a country and thwarts the ability of the
majority to employ both capital and labor effectively.
An historical example typifying the evolution from mercantilism to industrial
capitalism in the modern period is encapsulated by the struggle between protectionist and
monopolist interests within the British Empire and the leaders of the Manchester School,
Richard Cobden, and John Bright, both of whom sought international peace through free
trade. Each of these men served as a Member of Parliament in the House of Commons

116

List, The National System of Political Economy, 141.

88
during the mid-to-late nineteenth century and were instrumental in championing the
rights of the English working man, equitable commercial policies, and peaceable
international relations. The core tenets of the Manchester School entailed an unwavering
fidelity to the principles of free trade and the resultant advantages of adopting such
economic stratagems. As a generality, their political ideology may be described as an
attempt to destabilize the entrenched socioeconomic and political interests that had been
embedded in British society for many years. The traditions of the Manchester School
imparted that certain principal economic and political philosophies were oft indivisible.
One of the most significant contributions of the Manchester School to the historical
dialectic “was their appreciation of the close interrelationship among economics, politics,
and ethics. Men like Cobden and Bright saw most of their goals, from free trade to
international peace and prosperity, as moral issues.”117 Founded by Cobden and Bright in
1838, the Anti-Corn Law Association, which became the Anti-Corn Law League, was the
organization utilized as a vehicle to combat the commercial and ethical dilemma of
burdensome import tariffs on grains that adversely impacted domestic farmers and British
consumers.
Cobden was a fitting advocate for Englishmen born outside the realms of
privilege and unmerited stature. He was raised on his father’s farm as a shepherd,
eventually working as a calico printer before entering British politics. Cobden’s
unpretentious background nurtured a prudent rationale and a formidable sincerity that
resonated in his writings and during his speeches. In his note to England, published in
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1835, he passionately exclaimed that “violence…can never prevail against the natural
wants and wishes of mankind…despotic laws against freedom of trade never can be
executed…interest will prevail: they may embarrass their own trade, but cannot hurt a
nation whose trade is free, so much as themselves.”118 The writings of Smith and Ricardo
had influenced Cobden in his advocacy of laissez-faire trade theory and helped him to
ascertain some of the principal derivations for societal woes. The English were
experiencing distress in part because of income disparities generated by the mercantilist
economic system that was upheld by members of the landed elite. Cobden and other
members of the Manchester School were able to unite the working class by framing the
divergence of opinion as one between pauper and privilege, democracy and aristocracy.
He questioned the justification for unremitting conquest and conflict, the acquisition of
colonies overseas, and the net advantages these outposts yielded for the British national
economy.
The aristocracy, through the martial apparatus of the British Empire, had seized
distant territories, subjugated indigenous peoples, and utilized human capital for the
cultivation and extraction of native agricultural produce. Cobden scrutinized these
ventures, casting doubt upon their overall contribution to English commerce. In his note
to England, Cobden muses that “Three hundred millions of permanent debt have been
accumulated—millions of direct taxation are annually levied—restrictions and
prohibitions are imposed upon our trade in all quarters of the world, for the acquisition or
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maintenance of colonial possessions; and all for what?”
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For Cobden, not only did the

slave economy represent a moral blight upon the honor of the British Empire, but the
material detriments of retaining these regions far exceeded their pecuniary benefit. The
sizeable expenditures incurred during these expeditions had distended the national debt,
encumbering British taxpayers with unnecessary financial afflictions. The Manchester
School believed that domestic prosperity for both citizens and commerce directly
correlated to peaceful international associations and benevolence abroad. However, for
these windfalls to take place, England had to surrender its colonial holdings that
generated onerous budgetary impositions and unshackle those forced into slavery and
servitude.
Cobden, Bright, and other members of the Manchester School vehemently lobbied
for the repeal of the Corn Laws and the liberation of slaves in the colonies. In their eyes,
abandoning these dishonorable practices and revoking these inequitable decrees would
symbolize a new era for the commerce of the British Empire and the welfare of its
citizens. Cobden reasoned that if “we no longer offer the exclusive privileges of our
markets to the West Indians, we shall cease, as a matter of justice and necessity, to
compel them to purchase exclusively from us…where, then, will be the semblance of a
plea for putting ourselves to the expense of governing and defending such countries?”120
He contended that the arguments of the aristocracy were fallacious and farcical,
predicated upon indefensible foundations. Withdrawing deleterious and synthetic
restrictions imposed upon foreign commercial activity would necessarily act as a
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precursor to the improvement of dispute resolution among concerned parties. The
emphasis of morality within the context of free trade secured greater assurances for the
possibility of fewer hostile engagements between entities. If the British Empire
discontinued the obstruction of maritime activities and extensive meddling in
international affairs, greater degrees of arbitration would occur, leading to reduced
mobilization.
The intrigues and spoils of war do not belong to the bourgeoisie, but rather to the
administrative, bureaucratic, and commercial elite as well as the aristocracy. Given the
opportunity for autonomy and independence, the predominance of citizens will employ
their capital and labor as effectively as possible. Individuals will expand their commercial
networks, extending tranquility both domestically and abroad. Regarding incessant
conflict, Cobden states that “the middle and industrious classes of England can have no
interest apart from the preservation of peace. The honours, the fame, the emoluments of
war belong not to them; the battle-plain is the harvest-field of the aristocracy, watered
with the blood of the people.”121 The bulk of English society desired peace, security, and
affordability with regards to everyday purchases. The acquisition, control, and retention
of distant lands had foisted agonizing financial burdens on the laity, increasing national
liabilities and taxes on commodities such as wheat, corn, and sugar. By relinquishing its
grasp on foreign holdings and allowing for self-governance, the British Empire would
diminish expenditures related to military armaments and reduce the fiscal bloat of
governmental operations.
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The Manchester School’s herculean effort to repeal the Corn Laws was a grueling
expedition that was fought on economic, social, and political fronts. The rhetorical
arguments utilized by Bright in favor of retracting this commercially inequitable
legislative decree involved the communication of American triumphalism regarding the
success of their democratic institutions to the English citizenry. In turn, the constructive
achievements of these bodies were invoked to lobby extensively for British parliamentary
reform. The battle “was primarily economic, yet it sprang…from the bitterness felt by the
great industrial centres of the north against the lion’s share of political power which, even
after the Reform Act of 1832, was still enjoyed by the large landowners. Bright argued
that…a balance must be struck between the power of the land and of industry.”122 The
economic implications for the repeal of the Corn Laws in favor of free trade and
forsaking mercantilist interests were equally important to the political implications of
parliamentary reform. The repeal of the Corn Laws, which exacted prejudicial tariffs on
foreign grain imports, would be accomplished by educating the English commonwealth
regarding the adverse political implications of these extortionate duties and levies and by
persuading certain parliamentarians to join in rescinding the edict. For too long, the
landed interests of the wealthy had taken precedence over the industrial class that heavily
contributed to the production and distribution of British commodities and the Manchester
School argued that for the national economy to evolve, an equalization of interests
needed to transpire.
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Cobden argued that England could no longer cater exclusively to the impulses of
its landowners if the British Empire was to progress socioeconomically. The reduction of
duties on grain, materially undermining the protections of the landed class, was a
prerequisite for increasing the likelihood that a multitude of British citizens had greater
opportunities for capital accumulation and improved livelihoods. The political aspirations
of the opposition and their misguided ambitions to be recognized for unsound economic
policies had strained commercial, domestic, and international relations. While
considering the effects of the Corn Laws, Cobden noted that “the question of the repeal of
the corn laws, then, resolves itself into one of absolute state necessity; since our foreign
trade, which is indispensable to the payment of the interest of the national debt, cannot be
permanently preserved if we persevere in a restrictive duty.”123 The British Empire had
become mired by fiscal inefficiencies that threatened to destabilize its national economy
and deteriorate its position in the modern world order. Historic wars, colonization efforts,
and bureaucratic overhead weighed heavily upon the crown and the British taxpayer. If
the English were to remain solvent, Cobden argued that the repeal of the Corn Laws was
a glaring blunder that needed correction posthaste.
Bright, equally gifted at public speaking, was a fiery orator raised in a Quaker
home outside the circles of privilege. He had earned his living as a businessman and
cotton manufacturer before embarking upon a political career. At the height of the Corn
Law debates in the mid-nineteenth century, the Anti-Corn Law League campaigned
extensively at the Covent Garden Theater in London and conducted many passionate
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speeches to lobby in favor of free trade and the revocation of the Corn Laws. The
degradation of the national economy, Bright exclaimed in an 1845 speech, was due to
“the collapse of the national industry—it was the failure of the sources whence flow the
prosperity of our trade, a calamity which arose from deficient harvest, those deficient
harvests being destructive to our trade and industry, because the Corn-law denied to us
the power of repairing the mischief by means of foreign supplies.”124 The removal of
certain unrelated taxes, Bright surmised, had not been wholly inegalitarian nor had the
apportioning of public funds been overly extravagant or inequitable. Rather, these
socioeconomic misfortunes arose, in part, from inadequate crop yields and the inability of
English merchants to import desired quantities of grain to equalize the shortfalls. The
repeal of the Corn Laws was a vital precondition for the British Empire to ease the
quotidian financial burdens of its citizens locally, strengthen the economy nationally, and
reinforce harmonious political associations through free trade internationally.
Bright’s foray into politics had enabled him to unearth the true motives of those
that supported the Corn Laws. The Establishment utilized its position of authority to
codify into law the preservation of the cumulative interests of the landed elite in England.
For a storied aristocracy that touted the supremacy of the British Empire in all aspects of
civil life, the detrimental consequences of the Corn Laws were effects that directly
contradicted their claims. Bright observed that “we find them legislating corruptly…they
sit down to make a law for the purpose of extorting from all the consumers of food a
higher price…that the extra price may find its way into the pockets of the proprietors of
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land, these proprietors being the very men by whom this infamous law is sustained.”
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While the mercantilist beneficiaries were some of the primary advocates for economic
policies that ostensibly furthered the interests of the working and industrial classes, the
realities of their impropriety communicated otherwise. The private ambitions of the elite
had deceived the citizenry, creating willful structural imbalances in national commercial
stratagem while corroding English societal fabric in the process.
The prohibition of grain imports favoring domestic landholders was an untenable
approach for the English in a global economy that was becoming markedly
interconnected during the mid-nineteenth century. The commercial and industrial
evolution of the British Empire was hindered by the Corn Laws, whose vestigial
amendments were designed to protect the ancien régime of British mercantilists. Their
refusal to adopt modern trade strategies and the economic doctrine of free trade had
caused material deprivations at local, regional, and national levels. The existence of
international competition and rivalries amongst commercial enterprises created valuable
circumstances that increased the quantities of both capital and labor, forming greater
opportunities for wealth creation and employment. By artificially eliminating competitive
rivalries in commodity pricing and reducing consumer choice, England was harming the
liquidity of its citizens and its own solvency. Bright contends that by withdrawing
“competition, the law prevents the good cultivation of the land of our country, and
therefore diminishes the supply of food which we might derive from it. It prevents…the
importation of foreign food from abroad and it also prevents the growth of supplies
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abroad, so that when we are forced to go there for them they are not to be found.”
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quantity of arable land had consolidated into fewer hands, creating a powerful class of
aristocratic proprietors that exacted influence in both commerce and politics. Their
insatiability came at the expense of British taxpayers who were shouldered with higher
prices, fewer goods, and a substandard existence.
The crowning achievement for Cobden and Bright was helping to repeal the Corn
Laws in 1846. Their efforts signaled the end of protectionism and monopolism in
England and the dawning of a new era where free trade and industrial capitalism had
triumphed over mercantilism. The leaders of the Manchester School believed that
commercial republicanism would accelerate international cohesion, facilitating the
opportunities for wealth creation and improving the livelihoods of individuals across
societies worldwide. Free trade and the refinement of commercial reciprocity was “far
more than an economic doctrine: they believed it would ‘draw men together…, thrust
aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language, and unite us in the bonds of
eternal peace.’”127 The beliefs of the Manchester School were extensions of
Montesquieu’s political theory of doux commerce, helping to erode the edifice of
entrenched socioeconomic and political interests. This transformation enabled the British
Empire and its representatives at economic, social, and political levels to disseminate the
principles of doux commerce both at home and abroad, proving the ways in which free
trade could engender pacific relations between individuals, businesses, and nations
globally.
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Conclusions
Extensive historiographical research pertaining to the genealogical origins of doux
commerce has yielded an abundant harvest. The political theory contained within the
Spirit of the Laws finds its ancestry as a social phenomenon in the writings of French
philosophes and was repurposed by Montesquieu to encompass a species of commercial
activity and an ethos that could be implemented by individuals, businesses, and nations at
economic, social, and political levels. Initially, the early modern merchant was the arbiter
of taste and virtue both locally and regionally. The value system bequeathed by merchant
professionals to their protégés and employed during trade activities progressed
throughout the eighteenth century at microeconomic levels, ultimately experiencing
adoption by political economists and free market thinkers in the late eighteenth century.
These prominent sociopolitical intellectuals formulated hybridized rhetorical arguments
in both speeches and scholarship, advocating that free trade and the principles of doux
commerce promoted international peace between communities.
A society’s governmental structure, commercial preference, and economic
modality are equally factorial to ascertaining its disposition to doux commerce.
Monarchs, especially autocratic or despotic ones, have traditionally amalgamated control
unto themselves or carefully delegated their authority to administrative, bureaucratic, and
commercial elites whose outlook will reinforce the domestic position of the tyrant’s
regime. To the corrupted monarchy, aristocracy, and nobility, commerce is but another
tool in the Machiavellian exercise of power. The inclinations of the courtly elite tend
towards the practice of luxury commerce, which entails maintaining a vice grip upon the
fixed wealth of its territory. The agricultural produce extracted therefrom are sold to fund
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the extravagant proclivities of the landholders and necessarily creates an imbalance in the
socioeconomic stratification of the citizenry. If the unquenchable appetites of the ruling
class exceed the wealth garnered from its moveable assets, they undertake expeditions to
expand their kingdoms and augment their capital. Historically, this has occasioned
instances of conquest, conflict, slavery, and subjugation as evinced by the kingdoms of
Portugal and Spain in their acquisition of foreign territories in the East Indies and the
New World. The usage of gold and silver as their specie of preference necessarily
curtailed economic development as burgeoning quantities of bullion simultaneously
devalued these precious metals in the process.
According to Montesquieu, the Dutch and English were more open to the
acceptance of doux commerce as their republican systems of government aligned more
favorably with its ideological tenets and practices. Although they impinged upon the
territories of foreign peoples, their colonization efforts were intended to facilitate
commercial expansion and the augmentation of capital through the creation of
settlements and outposts, rather than the proliferation of barbarity. Their preference of
commercial dominance over political dominance through the utilization of bills of
exchange, credit networks, and paper notes created more complex trade nexuses and the
possibilities for increased wealth opportunities among citizens globally. Additionally, the
usage of currency in its ideal form enhanced trade partnerships between individuals,
businesses, and nations while strengthening interdependence through increased
circulation of both capital and commodities. As the virtuous principles of doux commerce
were propagated internationally through merchants, scholars, and eventually by larger
entities, more peaceful and diplomatic relations between nations came to the fore. These
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republics experienced a greater deal of security than monarchies for both citizens and
commerce resulting from mediation rather than militaristic intrusion. However, a major
obstruction to the flourishing of doux commerce in both kingdoms and republics was the
perpetuation of mercantilism and the obstinacy of entrenched sociopolitical interests in
both systems of government to rescind unfavorable trade laws that created auspicious
environments for the existence of monopolies within domestic industry.
Doux commerce and the instillation of righteous moral principles and honorable
commercial behavior in merchants during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
were some of the primary catalysts for the gradual erosion of mercantilist interests. The
qualities of insightfulness, justice, and trust were some of the characteristics that
distinguished the mercantile intermediary body as more ethically conscious than their
elitist counterparts. Their perceptive nature, worldly disposition, and increased
learnedness during the mid-to-late eighteenth century gave them the tools to formulate an
attenuated species of luxury that contrasted markedly from the more extravagant
indulgences of the aristocracy. They offered contemporaneous merchants and
manufacturers an opportunity for realizing comforts and conveniences available to their
station without offending the sensibilities of their countrymen. As citizens of the body
politic, the mercantile order acknowledged that doux commerce and the positive moral
implications of its execution could be emulated and propagated by businessmen and the
laity. The communication of these values and its suffusion among businesses came to be
realized through the epistolary correspondence of transatlantic merchant actors.
Letter writing was one of the most important mediums of interaction between
merchants and companies in conveying relevant information across a diverse range of
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sectors and topics. The discussion of contemporary issues made commercial agents some
of the most well-informed individuals pertaining to commodity prices and current events
of the day. Their letters reveal the difficulties in upholding doux commerce as their
economic interests were occasionally at odds with the administrative, bureaucratic, and
commercial elites who were determined to conserve their privileged positions within
mercantilist regimes. The practices of asceticism and pacifism were challenged by macrolevel events such as the Seven Years’ War and the Revolutionary War in the mid-to-late
eighteenth century. Merchants of doux commerce experienced internal struggles during
wartime because their efforts to maintain neutrality were challenged by the need to
sustain their businesses and the international conflict offered prospects of income
garnered from the supply of military equipment. Their epistolary correspondences
demonstrated their perspicacity with regards to the intricate undercurrents of the early
modern period. A steadfast dedication to reputation and the conservation of peace was
confronted intermittently by the complex socioeconomic and political dynamics of
mercantilism whose protectionist factions were unbending in their monopolistic
worldviews.
The erosion of mercantilist interests and the evolution of doux commerce
progressed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the works of political
economists and free market thinkers such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. They
determined that commerce must be wholly unfettered for societies to evolve
socioeconomically. Montesquieu’s political theory of doux commerce was inextricably
linked with free trade and the promotion of international peace between societies because
economies that refrained from exacting inordinate duties and levies against trade partners
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were more likely to have pacific associations with one another than those that did not.
Historically, nations had been at odds with one another because of inequitable import
tariffs on extraneous commodities such as those imposed upon the Dutch by the French
and later upon the French by the English. One of the sources of these commercial
disputes was the creation and perpetuation of imbalanced legislative decrees such as the
Corn Laws. These edicts had advanced the economic interests of the landed elite at the
expense of the British majority for several decades in the early-to-mid nineteenth century.
English MPs Richard Cobden and John Bright argued that for free trade to exist without
caveats or restrictions, these statutes needed to be rescinded. Their arguments in
Parliament, coupled with their speeches and scholarship, embodied an immense effort to
combat the Establishment that was willfully hindering the economic progression of the
British Empire and the socioeconomic disposition of its people.
This scholarly effort has sought to determine the genealogical origins of
Montesquieu’s doux commerce and trace its evolution as well as its significance
throughout the early modern and modern periods. The notion finds its genesis as a social
conception, formulated by French philosophes such as Michel de Montaigne in the late
sixteenth century and expanded upon by Voltaire in the early-to-mid eighteenth century.
With the publication of Spirit of the Laws in the mid-eighteenth century, doux commerce
was revitalized by Montesquieu to encompass a multifaceted political theory. This system
was both a species of commerce and an ethos which could be practiced at economic,
social, and political levels by individuals, businesses, and governments. The ideas were
initially promoted in the commercial realm by merchants in the late seventeenth century
through the publication of business manuals such as Le parfait négociant and reproduced
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throughout the eighteenth century. Their efforts were significant because as these
mercantile agents became more refined in their conduct and education, they positively
affected both citizens and societies globally. The propagation of urbane deportment in
business dealings and the creation of a tempered form of luxury ignited a moderated
ambition in seeking the middling ranks of nobility without adopting the rapacious
inclinations of the aristocracy. These aspirational mentalities and the insistence on
harmonious commercial accords materially undermined the entrenched sociopolitical
interests whose policies had fostered domestic income disparities and foreign wars, rather
than peace. The mercantilist edifices of power were further eroded by the intellectual
labors of political economists and free market advocates in the late eighteenth and earlyto-mid nineteenth centuries. Doux commerce was a precursor to and necessarily
coincided with the ideas of laissez-faire trade theory in that amity between entities would
strengthen the bonds of commercial unity rather than rend them apart. The campaign to
repeal prejudicial commercial regulations such as the Corn Laws by Richard Cobden and
John Bright signified the fusion of Montesquieu’s doux commerce and free trade
advocacy. These commercial realities would reinforce peaceful international relations and
enhance opportunities for wealth creation among societies worldwide. Doux commerce
facilitated the dissolution of mercantilism and was integral to the advent and proliferation
of industrial capitalism.

103
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Anonymous. “Essai sur l’éducation du négociant.” Journal de commerce et d’agriculture,
February, 1762.
Bright, John. Speeches on Questions of Public Policy. England: Macmillan, 1892.
Castel de Saint-Pierre, Charles Irénée. A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in
Europe. First Proposed by Henry IV. Of France, and Approved of by Queen
Elizabeth, and Most of the Then Princes of Europe, and Now Discussed at Large,
and Made Practicable by the Abbot St. Pierre, of the French Academy. London: J.
W. & Burleigh, 1714.
Champion, Richard, and Guttridge, G. H. The American Correspondence of a Bristol
Merchant, 1766–1776; Letters of Richard Champion. University of California,
Berkeley. University of California Publications in History; v. 22, No. 1.
Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus Reprint, 1974.
Cobden, Richard. The Political Writings of Richard Cobden. Cassell & Co, 1886.
Johnson, Joshua. Joshua Johnson’s Letterbook, 1771–1774: Letters from a Merchant in
London to his Partners in Maryland. Edited by Jacob M. Price. London: London
Record Society 1979. British History Online, accessed April 18, 2022,
https://www.british-history.ac.uk/london-record-soc/vol15.
List, Friedrich. The National System of Political Economy. England: New York and
Bombay, Longmans, Green, & Co., 1904.
Montaigne, Michel de. Essais. 3 vols. Paris: Nelson, 1913.
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat de. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated by Thomas
Nugent. Hafner Library of Classics, no. 9. New York: Hafner Pub., 1949.
Plumsted, Robert. Yale University, Beinecke Rare Books and Manuscripts Library,
Osborn shelves fc 160, Robert Plumsted Letter Book (1752–1756).
Plumsted, Robert. ‘No. 2 of a collection of books from the library of Henry Bradshaw
presented to the University by his friends 1887,’ University of Cambridge,
University Library, Add MS 2,798, Robert Plumsted Letter Book (1756–1758).
Ricardo, David. The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. No Place, Unknown,
or Undetermined: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1911.

104
Savary, Jacques. Le parfait négociant, ou, Instruction générale pour ce qui regarde le
commerce des marchandises de France, & des pays étrangers pour la banque, le
change & rechange. 2 vols. Paris: Veuve Estienne & Fils, 1749–1753.
Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. New York (State): J. M. Dent; E. P. Dutton, 1910.
Voltaire. L’Envieux. In Œuvres complètes de Voltaire. 52 vols. Edited by Louis Moland.
Vol. 3.2, 523–570. Paris: Garnier, 1877–1885.
Secondary Sources
Behrens, Betty. “Nobles, Privileges and Taxes in France at the End of the Ancien
Regime.” Economic History Review 15, no. 3 (1963): 451–475.
Bowman, Francis J. “Dutch Diplomacy and the Baltic Grain Trade, 1600–1660.” Pacific
Historical Review 5, no. 4 (1936): 337–348.
Chaudhuri, K. N. “Precious Metals and Mining in the New World: 1500–1800.”
European Review 2, no. 4 (1994): 261–270.
Cheney, Paul Burton. Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the French
Monarchy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Hirschman, Albert O. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism
before Its Triumph. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
Howse, Robert. “Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace.” Brooklyn
Journal of International Law 31, no. 3 (2006): 693–708.
Jones, Colin. “The Great Chain of Buying: Medical Advertisement, the Bourgeois Public
Sphere, and the Origins of the French Revolution.” American Historical Review
101, no. 1 (1996): 13–40.
McDonald, Patrick J. “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 48, no. 4 (2004): 547–572.
Shovlin John, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism, and the Origins of
the French Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Smith, S. D., and Wheeley, T. R. “‘Requisites of a Considerable Trade’: The Letters of
Robert Plumsted, Atlantic Merchant, 1752–58.” English Historical Review 124,
no. 508 (2009): 545–570.
Wallace, Elisabeth. “The Political Ideas of the Manchester School.” University of
Toronto Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1960): 122–138.

